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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the abolishment of charitable immunity, hospitals in West
Virginia have faced exposure to liability in medical malpractice cases
notwithstanding the 1986 passage of the Medical Professional Liability
Act (MPLA), West Virginia's attempt at tort reform in response to the
"medical malpractice crisis." While the MPLA plainly applies to hospi-
tals, it has not, as a practical matter, limited the circumstances under
which hospitals can be drawn into medical malpractice actions because
of the expanding judicial imposition of vicarious liability to hospitals.
This Article will examine the areas in which a hospital, under
West Virginia law, may be found liable for personal injuries to pa-
tients and others. This Article will discuss the MPLA and its impact
upon existing West Virginia law regarding medical malpractice and
hospital liability; the judicial expansion of hospitals' vicarious liability;
hospitals' potential liability for failure to adequately screen and moni-
tor the activities of the medical staff; and liability outside of the tradi-
tional medical malpractice context.
1. Excluded from discussion in this Article are suits outside the personal injury con-
text, such as claims by staff physicians against the hospital for failing to grant privileges,
etc., see Mahmoodian v. United Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 404 S.E.2d 750 (W. Va. 1991); Jacqueline
Oliverio, Comment, Hospital Liability for Defamation of Character During the Peer Review
Process: Sticks and Stones May Break My Bones, But Words May Cost Me My Job, 92 W.
VA. L. REV. 739 (1990), and employment related lawsuits, Birthisel v. Tri-Cities Health
Servs. Corp., 424 S.E.2d 606 (W. Va. 1992); Graf v. West Virginia Univ., 429 S.E.2d 496
(W. Va. 1992), including actions by employees under the "deliberate intention" exception of
the West Virginia Workers' Compensation Act, W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2(c)(2) (Supp. 1992)
(commonly referred to as Mandolidis actions after the case of Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus.,
Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1978), where the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
significantly broadened the scope of employer liability).
This Article also does not address federal claims for liability for "patient dumping"
under the Federal Emergency Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1988),
which is an article unto itself and, in fact, has been covered in this journal. James P.
McHugh, Comment, Emergency Care for Indigents: All Hospitals Must Provide Stabilizing
Treatment or Pay the Price, 93 W. VA. L. REV. 165 (1990); see also Helene Hoffman,
Does COBRA Work? The Problem of Patient Dumping and Possible Solutions, 25 J.
HEALTH & HosP. L. 1 (1992); Ingrid M. Orentas, Making COBRA Work: The Role of the
Federal Courts, 25 J. HEALTH & HosP. L. 15 (1992).
[Vol. 95:943
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II. HosPITALs AND THE WEST VIRGINIA MEDICAL
PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY Acr
A. Applicability
In 1986, the West Virginia Legislature, responding to a crisis -in
the availability of medical malpractice insurance,2 passed the MPLA to
place limits on liability in cases involving medical malpractice The
MPLA applies to injuries sustained after its effective date, June 6,
1986,' and places limitations upon all medical professional liability
actions against health care providers and facilities. Since the MPLA
2. See W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-1 (Supp. 1992) (legislative declaration of purpose).
One author traces the medical malpractice crisis to 1974 when "the issue of medical mal-
practice exploded across America as health care providers saw their medical malpractice lia-
bility insurance premiums increase up to 500% virtually overnight." Larry M. Pollack, Medi-
cal Maloccurrence Insurance (MMI): A First-Party, No-Fault Insurance Proposal for Resolv-
ing the Medical Malpractice Controversy, 23 TORT & INS. L.J. 552, 557 (1988) (citing P.
DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 85 (1985)). The crisis has been explained by inadequate
charging of premiums caused by extreme competition, pressure by medical providers to keep
rates down, an increase in malpractice litigation and liberal courts and generous juries. lId
at 558-59. A first crisis abated by 1976; however, "as interest rates dropped sharply in
1984, the continuing severity of premium loss sparked the current round of the medical
malpractice crisis." Il at 560.
Some question whether there ever was a crisis. Michael J. Saks, In Search of the
Lawsuit Crisis, 14 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 77 (1986); Medical Mystery, CHARLESTON
SUNDAY GAzETrE-MAIL, Feb. 7, 1993, at 2B (editorial disputing reported loss of obstetri-
cians); Robert B. Pulliam, M.D., Evaluation of the Obstetrical Care System in West Virgin-
ia, 89 W. VA. MED. J. 6 (1993) (analysis of practicing obstetricians in W. Va.); Richard D.
Lindsay, Tort Reform Figures are Misleading, CHARLESTON SUNDAY GAzE -MAIL, Feb.
14, 1993, at 43. For a discussion of the efficacy of malpractice tort reform, see James
Ludlam, The Real World of Malpractice Tort Reform, Parts I & II, 23 J. HEALTH & HOSP.
L. 321, 353 (1990). See also Pete V. Domenici & William W. Faisgraf, Health Care Re-
form: Should Curbing Medical Malpractice Litigation Be Part of the Solution?, A.B.A. J.,
Aug. 1992, at 42-43 (Domenici argues "yes," Fasgraf argues "no").
3. W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-1 to -11 (Supp. 1992) [hereinafter cited as "MPLA
§ -"I.
4. MPLA § 10.
5. The MPLA contains the following definitions:
(b) "Health care facility" means any clinic, hospital, nursing home, or extended
care facility in and licensed by the state of West Virginia and any state operated
institution or clinic providing health care.
1993]
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governs all medical professional liability (formerly medical malpractice)
actions, knowledge of its provisions is essential to understanding hospi-
tal liability in West Virginia for two reasons. First, the MPLA directly
affects hospitals because it governs actions against nurses, technicians,
and other employees as well as doctors. Second, because judicial deci-
sions have expanded hospitals' vicarious liability, hospitals now face
potential liability for nonemployee physicians. Evaluation of hospital
caSes, therefore, must occur within the confines of the MPLA.
At the heart of the MPLA is a series of interrelated definitions
establishing its application. "Medical professional liability actions" are
defined to include "any liability for damages resulting from the death
or injury of a person for any tort or breach of contract based on
health care services rendered, or which should have been rendered, by
a health care provider or health care facility to a patient."
6
The MPLA defines "health care" as "any act or treatment per-
formed or furnished, or which should have been performed or fur-
nished, by any health care provider for, to or on behalf of a patient
during the patient's medical care, treatment or confinement." 7
These definitions are consistent with preexisting law that a physi-
cian-patient relationship must exist to support a medical malpractice
action. In Rand v. Miller,8 the absence of a physician-patient relation-
ship barred an employee from bringing a malpractice claim against a
physician who examined him at the request of his employer.9 Apply-
ing this principle in Sisson v. Seneca Mental Health Center,"0 the
(c) "Health care provider" means a person, partnership, corporation, facility or
institution licensed by, or certified in, this state or another state, to provide health
care or professional health care services, including, but not limited to, a physician,
osteopathic physician, hospital, dentist, registered or licensed practical nurse, op-
tometrist, podiatrist, chiropractor, physical therapist, or psychologist, or an officer,
employee or agent thereof acting in the course and scope of such officer's,
employee's or agent's employment.
Id § 2.
6. i § 2(d).
7. Id. § 2(a).
8. 408 S.E.2d 655 (W. Va. 1991).
9. See also Fought v. Solce, 821 S.W.2d 218 ('ex. Ct. App. 1991) (telephone call
between an on-call and a treating physician does not create a physician-patient relationship).
10. 404 S.E.2d 425 (W. Va. 1991).
[Vol. 95:943
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Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed summary judg-
ment for a counselor who became sexually involved with the plaintiff
because there was no evidence that a "trust relationship" had arisen.11
The MPLA applies to actions against hospitals, defining both
"healthcare provider" and "healthcare facility" to include hospitals
12
as well as any "officer, employee or agent thereof acting in the course
and scope of such officer's, employee's or agent's employment."
13
These definitions are significant because they eliminate the sugges-
tion in prior West Virginia cases that actions against hospitals are
mere "negligence" actions as opposed to medical malpractice ac-
tions. 4 By defining hospitals, nurses, and their agents as "health care
providers," the MPLA places them on the same footing as physicians
in its statutory scheme.
The MPLA definitions, however, limit which hospitals qualify.
Healthcare providers must be "licensed by, or certified in, this state or
another state, to provide health care or professional health care servic-
es.",15 Healthcare facilities-hospitals, nursing homes, or extended care
facilities-include those "in and licensed by the state of West Virginia
and any state operated institution or clinic providing health care."
16
11. lML at 429. In a related vein, suits by spouses of patients having sex with a coun-
selor are barred under West Virginia's alienation of affection statute, W. VA. CODE § 56-3-
2a (Supp. 1992). Weaver v. Union Carbide, 378 S.E.2d 105 (W. Va. 1989).
12. MPLA § 2(b); see definitions supra note 5.
13. MPLA § 2(c); see definitions supra note 5.
14. Compare Duling v. Bluefield Sanitarium, 142 S.E.2d 754 (W. Va. 1965) with
Thornton v. CAMC, 305 S.E.2d 316 (W. Va. 1983).
15. MPLA § 2(c).
16. Id. § 2(a)-(c); see W. VA. CODE § 16-5B-1 to -12 (1991 & Supp. 1992) (licens-
ing of hospitals); W. VA. CODE § 16-5C-1 (1991) (licensing of nursing and personal care
homes); W. VA. CODE § 16-51-1 (1991) (licensing of hospices). The MPLA can also apply
to hospitals located in other states. However, assuming the negligence took place there,
West Virginia would apply the other states' substantive law. In Vest v. St. Albans Hosp.,
387 S.E.2d 282 (W. Va. 1989), a pre-MPLA case, the court found that Virginia substantive
law governed the claim since the hospital was located in Virginia and the negligence took
place there. However, the court refused to apply Virginia's medical malpractice law which
required notification of the defendant and submission to a medical review panel and which
required dismissal of any case brought in violation of its provisions. Id at 286.
In addition, it is an open question whether the MPLA applies to federally operated
hospitals. Some federal courts have applied state malpractice acts to federal hospitals. See
1993]
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Absent an appropriate license, the MPLA might not apply, stripping
the facility of its protections. 17
The MPLA is limited to actions arising out of care of a "patient"
defined as a "natural person who receives or should have received
health care from a licensed health care provider under a contract,
express or implied.""8 This definition was discussed in Ricottilli v.
Summersville Memorial Hospital.'9
Ricottilli involved claims for emotional distress damages against a
hospital arising out of the autopsy of the plaintiff's deceased child.
The plaintiff argued that the MPLA applied, providing a two-year stat-
ute of limitations, making the action timely. However, by finding that
the body was not a "patient," the court concluded that the MPLA did
not apply.
By definition, the [MPLA] pertains to liability arising from the provisions
of "health care" which is defined as "treatment performed or furnished, or
which should have been performed or furnished ... on behalf of a pa-
tient .... ." W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-2(a). Because the term patient is fur-
ther defmed as a "natural person," a deceased individual is necessarily
precluded from qualifying as a patient under the [MPLA], and therefore
cannot be the basis for a cause of action alleging medical professional lia-
bility pursuant to the Act.2°
Ricottilli provides good news and bad news. Even though it pro-
vided a shorter statute of limitations, its restrictive view of the "pa-
tient" definition has the absurd result of excluding pathologists from
the protections of the MPLA. Certainly, the MPLA was designed to
protect all physicians and health care providers-even pathologists.
Because of its unusual facts, Ricottilli is best viewed as an application
Starns v. United States, 923 F.2d 34 (4th Cir. 1991); Carter v. United States, 768 F. Supp.
670 (N.D. Ind. 1991).
17. For example, in Ricottilli v. Summersville Memorial Hosp., 425 S.E.2d 629
(W. Va. 1992), the court held that a dead body was not a "patient" as defined in the
MPLA; therefore, it held the MPLA inapplicable. See also Rudemacher v. Tountas, 474
N.W.2d 446 (Mimi. Ct. App. 1991).
18. MPLA § 2(e).
19. 425 S.E.2d 629 (W. Va. 1992).
20. Id. at 633.
[Vol. 95:943
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of West Virginia law allowing recovery for emotional distress based
on the mishandling of a corpse." Nonetheless, Ricottilli suggests that
where its definitions are not met, the MPLA will not apply.
B. Elements of Proof
Section 3 of the MPLA codifies the classic elements of a medical
malpractice case: breach of the standard of care, proximate cause, and
injury.
The following are necessary elements of proof that an injury or death
resulted from the failure of a health care provider to follow the accepted
standard of care:
(a) The health care provider failed to exercise that degree of care,
skill and learning required or expected of a reasonable, prudent health care
provider in the profession or class to which the health care provider be-
longs acting in the same or similar circumstances; and
(b) Such failure was a proximate case of the injury or death.'
Under the MPLA, once the plaintiff presents appropriate evidence
that the defendant breached the standard of care, the issue becomes a
jury question.23 Moreover, the statutory definition of the standard of
care does not disturb the application of West Virginia's comparative
fault system to MPLA cases?2
1. The Standard of Care
The MPLA definition of the standard of care makes it clear that
hospitals, like other healthcare providers, are to be evaluated against
21. See also Bennett v. 3 C Coal Co., 379 S.E.2d 388 (W. Va. 1989).
22. MPLA § 3. The MPLA maintains a 'unitary" standard of care, applicable to all
patients. One author has suggested that patient resources should be a factor in determining
the legal adequacy of care provided. John A. Siliciano, Wealth, Equity and The Unitary
Medical Malpractice Standard, 77 VA. L. REV. 439 (1991).
23. Fortney v. AI-Haji, 425 S.E.2d 264 (W. Va. 1992). For a case discussing jury
instructions which would comply with section 3 of the MPLA, see Howe v. Thompson, 412
S.E.2d 212, 215-17 (W. Va. 1991).
24. See Howe v. Thompson, 412 S.E.2d 212, 218-19 (W. Va. 1991); King v. Kayak
Mfg. Corp., 387 S.E.2d 511 (W. Va. 1989).
19931
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similar hospitals. For example, a rural community hospital would not
be held to the same standards as an urban tertiary care center. Hospital
employees such as nurses and technicians must be judged against
reasonable and prudent nurses and technicians. This is a subtle change
from prior law, under which hospitals were broadly required to provide
such reasonable care and attention as required by the patients' mental
and physical condition.5 Under the MPLA, cases against hospitals are
elevated to "malpractice" status, requiring proof of the standard of care
by expert testimony.
The MPLA leaves standing the principle that hospitals and other
health care providers are not required to exercise the highest degree of
skill in treatment absent special contract to do so.26 Errors in
judgment are not negligence27 and injured patients cannot recover
damages simply by showing an undesirable outcome.28 Hospitals are
not insurers of patient safety.
29
25. See Hundley v. Martinez, 158 S.E.2d 159 (W. Va. 1967); Duling v. Bluefield
Sanitarium, 142 S.E.2d 754 (W. Va. 1965). The MPLA is consistent with existing West
Virginia law regarding physicians: "IT]he plaintiff must show that the defendant-physician
was guilty of a want of professional skill or of negligence which resulted in injury to the
plaintiff." Hicks v. Chevy, 358 S.E.2d 202, 205 (W. Va. 1987) (citing Hinkle v. Martin,
256 S.E.2d 768 (W. Va. 1979); Hundley v. Martinez, 158 S.E.2d 159 (W. Va. 1967);
Schroeder v. Adkins, 141 S.E.2d 352 (W. Va. 1965); White v. Moore, 62 S.E.2d 122 (W.
Va. 1950).
26. See White v. Moore, 62 S.E.2d 122 (W. Va. 1950); see also Starr v. Fregosi, 370
F.2d 15 (5th Cir. 1966) (failure to cure not negligence); Crawford v. Anagnostopoulos, 387
N.E.2d 1064 (111. App. CL 1979).
27. Dye v. Corbin, 53 S.E.2d 147 (W. Va. 1906). In Davis v. Wang, 400 S.E.2d 230
(W. Va. 1990), the West Virginia Supreme Court held that a "Dye v. Corbin" instruction-
that a mistake in judgment is not negligence-was not appropriate where the physician
could not recall whether he had ever examined the patient and evidence was presented that
he had never reviewed the chart. See also Kinning v. Nelson, 281 N.W.2d 849 (Minn.
1979); Mitchell v. Had], 816 S.W.2d 183 (Ky. 1991) (wrong but reasonable opinion not
negligence). Compare Jones v. Chidester, 610 A.2d 964 (Pa. 1992) (Pennsylvania's "Two
Schools of Thought").
28. See Gaston v. Hunter, 588 P.2d 326, 343 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978); Sullivan v. Hen-
ry, 287 S.E.2d 652, 659 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982); Wasem v. Laskowski, 274 N.W.2d 219,
224-25 (Minn. 1979); Harris v. Grizzle, 625 P.2d 747 (Wyo. 1981); Miller v. Kennedy, 583
P.2d 734 (Wash. 1978); Burks v. Meredith, 546 S.W.2d 366 (rex. Ct. App. 1977).
29. See Mullins v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., 402 So. 2d 170 (La. Ct. App.
1951); Riddlesperger v. United States., 406 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Ala. 1976).
950 [Vol. 95:943
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By requiring specific elements, the MPLA is consistent with prior
law, under which res ipsa loquitur was sparingly applied in medical
malpractice cases:
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur cannot be invoked where the existence of
negligence is wholly a matter of conjecture and the circumstances are not
proved, but must themselves be presumed, or when it may be inferred that
there was no negligence on the part of the defendant. The doctrine applies
only in cases where a defendant's negligence is the only inference that can
reasonably and legitimately be drawn from the circumstances.'
One area where the MPLA changes existing law is informed con-
sent. Because the MPLA now defines the standard of care by reference
to reasonably prudent health care providers in the same or similar
circumstances, it is different than prior law. In Cross v. Trapp,3 the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia adopted the "patient need"
standard, requiring that informed consent be measured by the reason-
able patient. The Cross v. Trapp court expressly rejected the "physi-
cian disclosure" standard national or community medical disclosure
* 32practice.
Contrary to Cross v. Trapp, the MPLA definition of the standard
of care suggests that physician disclosure standards are now the appro-
priate measure of informed consent and must be established by expert
testimony.33 While hospitals are generally not liable for failure of a
30. Farley v. Meadows, 404 S.E.2d 537, 539 (W. Va. 1991) (citing Davidson's, Inc.,
v. Scott, 140 S.E.2d 807, syl. pt. 5 (W. Va. 1965)). Farley was a negligent sterilization
claim in which the plaintiff relied completely on res ipsa loquitur. The court refused to
apply the doctrine, stating:
It would be entirely reasonable to infer that the band was correctly applied to
Ms. Farley's right fallopian tube, but that it came off soon thereafter-that
Ms. Farley was the one out of every three hundred patients for whom the steril-
ization procedure was destined to fail. Clearly, then, that Dr. Meadows negligently
performed the tubal ligation is not the only inference we can draw from the facts.
Thus, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur cannot apply to this case.
Farley, 404 S.E.2d at 539. Compare Napoli v. Hinsdale Hosp., 572 N.E.2d 995 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1991).
31. 294 S.E.2d 446 (W. Va. 1982).
32. 1& at 455; see also Adams v. El-Bash, 338 S.E.2d 381, 385 (W. Va. 1985).
33. MPLA § 7; see infra part U.C; see also Savold v. Johnson, 443 N.W.2d 656
(S.D. 1989); Snawder v. Cohen, 804 F. Supp. 910 (W.D. Ky. 1992); Culbertson v. Mernitz,
1993]
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private physician to gain consent, this distinction is significant because
they can be held vicariously liable under West Virginia law in in-
formed consent cases where the physician is an employee or agent of
the hospital. 4
2. Proximate Cause
Section 3(b) of the MPLA requires that the medical professional
negligence be "a proximate cause" of plaintiff's injury.3' Since this
term is not defined in the MPLA, preexisting law serves to establish
its parameters.
The health care provider's negligence must be at least a "substan-
tial factor" in the ultimate outcome.
Where a plaintiff in a malpractice case has demonstrated that a
defendant's acts or omissions have increased the risk of harm to the plain-
tiff and that such increased risk of harm was a substantial factor in bring-
ing about the ultimate injury to the plaintiff, then the defendant is liable
for such ultimate injury.'
The chain of proximate cause is not necessarily broken by the
negligence of a subsequent treating health care provider. Where the
negligence is foreseeable, the original provider may still be liable.3 s
Proximate cause must ordinarily be proven by expert testimony
establishing a reasonable probability that the defendant's act caused the
plaintiff's injuries."'
602 N.W.2d 98 (Ind. 1992).
34. See discussion infra part ]1I.B.
35. MPLA §- 3(b).
36. See also Peak v. Ratliff, 408 S.E.2d 300 (W. Va. 1991); Anderson v. Moulder,
394 S.E.2d 61 (W. Va. -1990).
37. Reager v. Anderson, 371 S.E.2d 619, syl. pt. 1 (W. Va. 1988); Thornton v.
CAMC, 305 S.E.2d 316, syl. pt. 5 (W. Va. 1983). Thornton, which involved plaintiff's
claim that the physician's negligence increased injuries sustained in an automobile accident,
is referred to as a "loss of a chance" case. Compare Fennell v. Southern Md. Hosp. Ctr.,
580 A.2d 206 (Md. 1990); Hurley v. United States, 923 F.2d 1091 (4th Cir. 1991) (both
rejecting "loss of chance" type theories); Fisher v. Ganju, 485 N.W.2d 10 (Wis. 1992).
38. Rine v. Irisari, 420 S.E.2d 541 (W. Va. 1992).
39. See Hicks v. Chevy, 358 S.E.2d 202, 205 (W. Va. 1987); Tottln v. Adongay, 337
[Vol. 95:943
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The MPLA attempted to reform the law of medical malpractice by
requiring that the standard of care be proven by expert testimony and
by providing specific guidelines as to the necessary qualifications of
expert witnesses.
1. Proving the Standard of Care
The MPLA requires that medical professional liability be proven
by expert testimony: "The applicable standard of care and a
defendant's failure to meet said standard, if at issue, shall be estab-
lished in medical professional liability cases by the plaintiff by testi-
mony of one or more knowledgeable, competent expert witnesses if re-
quired by the court."4° This provision is basically consistent with ex-
isting West Virginia law. "It is the general rule that in medical mal-
practice cases negligence or want of professional skill can be proved
only by expert witnesses. ' 41 The rule was applied in Farley v. Mead-
ows,4 2 where the court refused to allow the plaintiff to rely on the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitor and proceed without an expert. In Farley,
the plaintiff claimed that the defendant physician negligently performed
a tubal ligation (placing elastic bands on the fallopian tubes to prevent
the passage of eggs from the ovaries into the uterus). The court noted
that whether the physician acted negligently was a matter outside the
common knowledge of jurors, thus indicating that the case required ex-
pert testimony.
S.E.2d 2 (W. Va. 1985); Hovermale v. Berkeley Springs Moose Lodge, 271 S.E.2d 335 (W.
Va. 1985); see also Rohrbough v. Wyeth Labor., Inc., 719 F. Supp. 470 (N.D. W. Va.
1989), aft'd, 916 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990); Fitzgerald v. Manning, 679 F.2d 341 (4th Cir.
1982).
40. MPLA § 7.
41. Hicks v. Chevy, 358 S.E.2d 202, 203 (W. Va. 1987) (affirming summary judge-
ment for physician where plaintiff failed to produce an expert); Hinkle v. Martin, 256
S.E.2d 768 (W. Va. 1979); Roberts v. Gale, 139 S.E.2d 272 (W. Va. 1979).
42. 404 S.E.2d 537 (W. Va. 1991).
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Interestingly, the court openly rejected the plaintiff's claim that a
"conspiracy of silence" among doctors prohibited her from obtaining
an expert witness:
Ms. Farley had ample time to retain an expert, and failed to do so.
She claims that there is a "conspiracy of silence" among medical profes-
sionals, and, of course, there is an understandable reluctance among doc-
tors to testify against fellow doctors with whom they must work every
day. However, it is obvious from the abundance of medical malpractice
cases that go to trial around the United States, and from the profusion of
medical experts advertising their services in the back of legal magazines,
that many doctors will gladly don their boxing gloves for a reasonable fee
and testify about malpractice matters away from their own home towns.43
Despite stating that the standard of care "shall" be proven by
expert testimony, the MPLA does not require experts in all cases;
experts are required only "if required by the court."44 At a status
conference required by the MPLA, the plaintiff must certify that an
expert has or will be retained to testify as to the applicable standard of
care or that no expert is required. If court rules that an expert is nec-
essary, the plaintiff must be given reasonable time to obtain one.45
- This language suggests that the MPLA maintains the "common
knowledge" exception to pre-MPLA law requiring experts, judicially
adopted in Totten v. Adongay.46 "The essence of this exception is
simply that certain medical situations present routine or noncomplex
matters which are cognizable under the common knowledge or experi-
ence of lay jurors and, therefore, the presence or absence of negligence
can be determined without resort to expert testimony. " 47 In Totten,
the court applied the rule, finding that whether an x-ray showed a
fracture was within the common knowledge of jurors; accordingly, the
43. Id at 539-40.
44. MPLA § 7.
45. Id § 6.
46. 337 S.E.2d 2 (W. Va. 1985); accord Austin v. St. Charles Gen. Hosp., 587 So.
2d 742 (La. Ct. App.), appeal denied, 590 So. 2d 80 (La. 1991) (no expert required in
patient fall case).
47. Totten, 337 S.E.2d at 7.
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plaintiff was not required to present expert testimony that failing to
diagnose the fracture was malpractice."
2. Qualifications
The MPLA also contains requirements for the qualification of
experts. Before the court allows an expert to testify, the MPLA pro-
vides that five factors must be established:
1) the opinion is actually held by the expert;
2) the opinion can be testified to with reasonable medical probability;
3) the expert possesses professional knowledge and expertise coupled with
knowledge of the applicable standard of care;
4) the expert is currently licensed in United States; and
5) the expert is engaged or qualified in same or similar field as defendant
health care provider.49
By requiring this foundation as to an expert's qualifications, the
MPLA is consistent with the principle that the trial court has the duty
to make the preliminary determination of a witness' qualifications as
an expert5° and that matters outside the field of a witness' expertise
are not admissible.51
48. In Toten, Justice Neely concurred that there was sufficient evidence to allow the
jury to determine negligence; however, he stated "it is stupid, to try any malpractice case,
no matter how outrageous, without the help of an expert witness." Id at 8.
49. MPLA § 7.
50. W. VA. R. EVID. 104(a); FRANKL3N D. CLECKLEY, HANDBOOK ON EVIDENCE FOR
WEST VIRGINIA LAwYERS § 1.8(D) (2d ed. 1986). "[]t is imperative that the Judge careful-
ly consider the witness' qualifications as an expert, not generally but specifically with re-
spect to the particular opinions the expert will express and the specialized knowledge she
will impart." 2 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & MtCHAEL M. MARTIN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVI-
DENCE MANUAL 14 (5th ed. 1990); accord Ventura v. Winegardner, 357 S.E.2d 764, 768
(W. Va. 1987). Absent this critical function, anyone willing to say "I'm an expert" could
testify about anything he wanted. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp.
1223, 1239 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) ("Court must have a detailed inquiry into the admissibility of
proffered [expert] testimony ....").
51. State v. Noe, 230 S:E.2d 826 (W. Va. 1976).
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Section 7 of the MPLA is significant to hospitals because quali-
fied experts must be used to prove the liability of nurses, technicians,
and other hospital employees rendering healthcare treatment. Often, ex-
perts in medical malpractice cases focus on physicians, but also ex-
press opinions as to the nurses and other nonphysicians.52 Under the
MPLA, an appropriate foundation must be established before such
testimony is admissible. Using the nurse as an example, the MPLA
requires an expert in nursing and nursing standards.53
On its face, the MPLA places more particular requirements on the
admissibility of expert testimony than the West Virginia Rules of
Evidence, which have been liberally interpreted by the Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia. Applying Rule 702, the court has al-
lowed testimony of experts with any level of knowledge helpful to the
jury, inferring that any deficiencies will affect the weight of testimony
rather than its admissibility. "The key test is whether the witness has
specialized knowledge that will assist the trier of fact." 54
In the face of this preexisting case law, the problem addressed by
the MPLA was how to exclude the "hired gun" or general purpose
medical expert willing to testify, regardless of the specialty of medi-
cine involved in a particular action.55 Two decisions interpreting sec-
52. See Duling v. Bluefield Sanitarium, 142 S.E.2d 754 (W. Va. 1965).
53. See Elizabeth W. Beyer & Pamela W. Popp, Nursing Standard Care in Medical
Malpractice Litigation: The Role of the Nurse Expert Witness, 23 J. HEALTH & HOSp. L.
363 (1990); Julie A. Ramson, Nursing Liability: Confusion in the Courts, FOR THE DE-
FENSE, Mar. 1989, at 13. For two views of nursing negligence cases, compare Hiatt v.
Groce, 523 P.2d 320 (Kan. 1974) (nursing negligence proven without expert) with Belman
v. St. Frances Cabrini Hosp., 427 So. 2d 541 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (nursing expert used by
plantiff).
54. See Ventura v. Winegardner, 357 S.E.2d 764, 768 (W. Va. 1987); Jones v.
Games, 395 S.E.2d 548 (W. Va. 1990). Of course, without proper qualifications-specialized
knowledge or skill or education not in the possession of the jurors-"it is difficult to see
how anyone could qualify as an expert." 2 SALTZBURG & MARTIN, supra note 50, at 13.
The court's inquiry, therefore, is "[d]oes this particular expert have sufficient specialized
knowledge to assist the jury in this case?" JACK B. WEINsTEN & MARGARET A. BERGER,
WENsTEIN's EVIDENCE 702, 707 (1981).
55. Simply allowing someone to testify as an expert gives them credence with juries.
See United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Mc-
Donald, 485 F. Supp. 1087, 1096 (E.D.N.C. 1986). Indeed, a recent study suggests that
juries are highly influenced by experts, Expert Witnesses Found Credible by Most Jurors,
[Vol. 95:943
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tion 7 of the MPLA, Gilman v. Choi 6 and Fortney v. Al-Hajj,57
however, indicate that the court will not interpret the MPLA as placing
more particularized requirements on experts than was required under
prior West Virginia law.
In Gilman v. Choi, the trial court precluded plaintiff's expert or-
thopedic surgeon from testifying against two defendants, an internist
and an emergency room physician, because he was not engaged in the
"same or substantially similar" medical field as required by section
7(e) of the MPLA. The trial court certified to the supreme court the
question whether section 7 was in conflict with Rule 702 of the West
Virginia Rules of Evidence.
The court found no conflict, stating that section 7(e) of the MPLA
was "concerned primarily with competency of expert testimony" unlike
Rule 702, "which is concerned primarily with relevancy. 5 8
The court discussed several "common law principles" applicable to
both the MPLA and Rule 702, and stated:
A medical expert, otherwise qualified, is not barred from testifying merely
because he or she is not engaged in practice as a specialist in the field
about which his or her testimony is offered; on the other hand, it is clear
that a medical expert may not testify about any medical subject without
limitation. 9
Discussing the MPLA, the court stated that "the party offering the
witness must establish that the witness has more than a casual famil-
iarity with the standard of care and treatment commonly practiced by
NAT'L L.J., Feb. 22, 1993, at 54. The validity of expert testimony is a widely argued topic
outside of West Virginia and the MPLA. See Ronald L. Carlson, Policing the Bases of
Modern Expert Testimony, 39 VAND. L. REV. 577 (1986). This debate has been hotly liti-
gated in toxic tort cases. James D. Pagliaro & Amelia C. Benton, Courtroom Science: Toxic
Tort Battleground, 3 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 1336 (Mar. -22, 1989); see In re Paoli Railroad
Yard PCB Litigation, 706 F. Supp. 358 (E.D. Pa. 1988), rev'd, 916 F.2d 829 (3rd Cir.
1990); Marcia Coyle, Supreme Court to Examine Scientific Proof, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 1, 1993,
at I (discussing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals).
56. 406 S.E.2d 200 (W. Va. 1991).
57. 425 S.E.2d 264 (W. Va. 1992)
58. Id. at 202.
59. Id at 204 (emphasis added).
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physicians engaged in the defendant's specialty" and suggested that
sufficient knowledge can be acquired through "practical experience,
recent formal training and study or a combination of these factors."6°
Accordingly, under Rule 702 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence or
under W. VA. CODE, 55-7B-7 [1986], a proper assessment of the compe-
tency of an expert medical witness, and the relevancy of that witness'
testimony, require the trial court to focus specifically on the act of medical
malpractice which is alleged; and, while there are circumstances in which,
for example, a generalist may testify as to the standard of care of a defen-
dant specialist, there are also circumstances in which a generalist or a
specialist in another field may not testify as to the standard of care of a
defendant specialist.61
The court remanded the case for the trial court to "apply the
foregoing principles in exercising sound discretion" in ruling whether
the plaintiffs expert was qualified, warning that it would be an abuse
of discretion to require that an expert be board certified in the same
specialty as the defendant because that requirement is not included in
the MPLA.
Justices Neely and Brotherton dissented, finding that the MPLA
was plainly intended to change the existing law of evidence by provid-
ing more stringent requirements than Rule 702.
For clause (e) to have any meaning, it must require something in
addition to what the previous clauses require. Recognizing this fact, and
given that the purpose of the [MPLA] ... is to alleviate the medical
malpractice insurance crisis, "qualified" must mean more than "possessing
professional knowledge and expertise coupled with knowledge of the appli-
cable standard of care" [the requirements of clause (c)] ....
... Precisely because of the liberality with which many courts treat
expert testimony in medical malpractice cases, physicians, hospitals, and
60. Id
61. Id A similar result was reached in a Louisiana case examining that state's medi-
cal malpractice statute where the court found that th expert did not have to actively prac-
tice to qualify. Piazza v. Behrman Chiropractic Clinic, 601 So. 2d 1378 (La. 1992); see
also Stackhouse v. Scanlon, 576 N.E.2d 635 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (chiropractor not qualified
to testify against physician); Joyce-Couch v. Desilva, 602 N.E.2d 286 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991)
(weaknesses in knowledge go to weight, not admissibility).
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insurance companies worked hard to get the legislature to impose by stat-
ute a stricter standard than that of Rule 702.6
Section 7 of the MPLA was discussed again in Fortney v. Al-
Hajj.63 The plaintiff went to a hospital emergency room, complaining
that a piece of chicken was stuck in his throat. The emergency room
physician ordered a barium swallow64 which allegedly caused a perfo-
ration of the plaintiff's esophagus. The plaintiff sued the emergency
room doctor, the hospital, and his treating physicians. The hospital
settled and the case was tried against the physicians, resulting in a
$350,000 verdict against the emergency room physician and a defense
verdict for the two subsequent treating physicians.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the plaintiff's expert, a gen-
eral surgeon, was not qualified under the MPLA because he "had not
worked in an emergency room other than to perform surgeries when
requested by emergency medical physicians." 65 Rejecting this argu-
ment, the court stated:
While [the defendant] was indeed practicing in the emergency room, it
must be acknowledged that the medical subject we are concerned with is
not simply the general practice of medicine, but rather the specific issue of
treatment of patients with blockages of the nature of that suffered by the
Appellee. Consequently, the emphasis must be on whether the proffered
expert... had the requisite experience to testify with regard to that latter
issue. While [he] only practiced in an emergency room setting when spe-
cifically needed for surgery, he had handled many impacted food cases
during his career.
... A physician's experience may qualify him to testify regarding
areas other than his board certified specialty. The fact that a testifying
expert physician may not have precisely the same specialty as a physician
defendant does not disqualify that testifying physician as an expert regard-
ing the standard of care to be employed by the physician defendant. By
emphasizing the fact that [plaintiff's expert] had not actually practiced
62. Id. at 205..
63. 424 S.E.2d 264 (W. Va. 1992).
64. A barium swallow is a procedure where the patient drinks contrast material (bari-
um) while being x-rayed. In Fortney, it was ordered to determine whether the plaintiff had
an obstruction in his throat. Id at 266.
65. Id at 267.
19931
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emergency medicine, [the defendant] is hedging the issue slightly. The
salient inquiry is to what extent [the expert] is qualified under West Vir-
ginia Code § 55-7B-7 to testify as an expert on the issue of [the
defendant's] standard of care in treating a patient suffering an impacted
food blockage. Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that [the expert]
was qualified to provide expert testimony on the issue of the standard of a
physician rendering assistance to a patient suffering from an impacted food
blockage. Any shortcomings which the Appellant believed existed in
[plaintiff's expert's] credentials could have properly been the subject of
cross-examination.'
Despite the legislature's efforts, Gilman and Fortney demonstrate
that the West Virginia Supreme Court will not apply the MPLA re-
quirements for qualifications of expert witnesses. While recognizing
that the MPLA was a valid way to change the law of expert qualifica-
tions, the court effectively ignored the statute and told trial courts they
may ignore it, especially subsection 7(e), and not be reversed under
the abuse of discretion standard.67 This was perversely applied in
Gilman, where the proffered expert had been refused by the trial court.
In Fortney, the court ignored the MPLA by focusing not on whether
the defendant's actions complied with a "reasonable, prudent health
care provider in the same profession or class ... acting in same or
similar circumstances" but on the medical condition treated. Thus, an
expert with "treatment experience" and not "emergency room experi-
ence" was permitted to testify on the standard of care of an emergency
room physician.
After Gilman and Fortney, the status of section 7 of the MPLA as
placing more stringent requirements on experts is at best unclear and
at worst ineffective. Perhaps the only clear statement from Gilman and
Fortney is that board certification is not a prerequisite to the admission
of expert testimony. Otherwise, the court has simply left the statute to
66. ML at 270-71.
67. The court's interpretation of MPLA § 7 effectively ignores the "spirit and intent"
of the legislature to tighten up expert qualifications in MPLA actions. This is reminiscent of
the court's statement that W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2 lessened the standard in Mandolidis cases
when the preamble to the statute states it was intended to tighten the standard. Compare W.
VA. CODE § 23-4-2 with Mayles v. Shoney's, Inc., 405 S.E.2d 15 (W. Va. 1990).
[Vol. 95:943
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be developed on a case-by-case basis through trial litigation, with the
benefit of the doubt going to admissibility.
D. Statute of Limitations
1. General Provisions
The MPLA codifies the statute of limitations, stating:
A cause of action for injury to a person alleging medical professional
liability against a health care provider arises as of the date of the injury,
except as provided in subsection (b) of this section [relating to minors],
and must be commenced within two years of the date of such injury, or
within two years of the date when such person discovers, or with the
exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered such injury, which-
ever last occurs: Provided, that in no event shall any such action be com-
menced more than ten years after the date of injury."
The MPLA statute of limitations is consistent with the general
two-year statute of limitations for tort actions.69 By including in the
definition of medical professional liability "any liability... for any
tort or breach of contract based on health care services rendered, or
which should have been rendered," the MPLA is also consistent with
existing law that actions for personal injuries, even if framed as breach
of contract claims, take a two-year statute of limitations and not the
longer period applicable to contract cases."0 Thus, all MPLA ac-
tions71 are subject to a two-year statute of limitations, except those
involving some minors.
68. MPLA § 4(a).
69. W. VA. CODE § 55-2-12 (1981); see Rodgers v. Corporation of Harpers Ferry,
371 S.E.2d 358 (W. Va. 1988).
70. See W. VA. CODE § 55-2-6 (1981). Generally, a suit for personal injuries, even
under a contract theory, is subject to a two-year statute of limitations. Maynard v. General
Elec., 486 F.2d 538 (4th Cir. 1973).
71. This applies even to a claim of breach of "a special contract to heal." Michael J.
Farrell, The Law of Medical Malpractice in West Virginia, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 251 (1979).
"The standard of care in a special contract to cure case is to cure the patient complete-
ly .... Any time a physician guarantees a result or suggests that complete success is an
expectation, then a special contract may exist .... ." Id at 259 (citations omitted).
1993]
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2. Minors
The MPLA contains a significant limitation related to minors not
found in pre-MPLA statutes or case law. The MPLA shortens the
statute of limitations for actions for injuries to minors under ten years
old, requiring that they be brought within two years of injury or prior
to the minor's twelfth birthday, whichever is longer.72 Prior law al-
lowed such actions to be brought by the' representative of a minor up
to the age of majority and by the minor within two years of reaching
"full age" except no case could be brought more than twenty years
after the injury.73
3. Tolling Doctrines
The MPLA codifies the discovery rule and fraudulent conceal-
ment75 as tolling doctrines. It tolls the running of the statute until the
person "discovers, or with the exercise of reasonable diligence should
76ThMLhave discovered" the injury. The MPLA also states "[t]he periods of
limitation set forth in this section shall be tolled for any period during
which the health care provider or its representative has committed
fraud or collusion by concealing or misrepresenting material facts
about the injury."'
72. MPLA § 4(b).
73. W. VA. CODE § 55-2-17 (1981). The MPLA does not specifically address incom-
petents; accordingly, its general language establishing a two-year statute of limitations proba-
bly governs.
74. See Hill v. Clark, 241 S.E.2d 572 (W. Va. 1978); Morgan v. Grace Hosp., 144
S.E.2d 156 (W. Va. 1965); Harrison v. Seltzer, 158 S.E.2d 159 (W. Va. 1967).
75. See W. VA. CODE § 55-2-17 (1981); Hundley v. Martinez, 158 S.E.2d 159
(W. Va. 1967); Sattler v. Bailey, 400 S.E.2d 220 (W. Va. 1990).
76. MPLA § 4.
77. IAL § 4(c). Fraudulent concealment requires a showing (1) that the dependent
fraudulently concealed facts which are the basis of plaintiff's claim; (2) plaintiff failed to
discover them within the statute of limitations; and (3) plaintiff exercised due diligence.
Pocahontas Supreme Coal Co. v. Bethlehem Steel, 828 F.2d 211, 218 (4th Cir. 1987). Igno-
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The MPLA tolling provisions were discussed in Miller v.
Romero," where the plaintiff relied on the "discovery rule" to allow
the filing of a wrongful death action more than two years after the
death of her daughter. The supreme court rejected this argument, find-
ing that the discovery rule did not apply in wrongful death cases under
section 55-7-6(d) of the West Virginia Code.
Despite holding that the MPLA did not apply since the death
occurred before its effective date, the court stated that the MPLA
statute of limitation applied only to injuries, not to deaths. "ITihe
omission of the word 'death' from West Virginia Code § 55-7B-4
must mean that the section applies only to injury cases and the legisla-
ture intended West Virginia Code § 55-7-6 to remain the applicable
provision for limitations of actions involving wrongful death."79
Nonetheless, the court held that wrongful death actions are subject to
tolling under the doctrine of fraudulent concealment.
A situation where a decedent's representative is barred from filing suit
against a malfeasor because that person fraudulently concealed the malprac-
tice, and the representative did not discover the negligence until after the
two-year period had run, violates the strong public policy of this State.'
The court was careful to limit this holding, stating "[t]he only
portion of West Virginia Code § 55-7-6 which we find to be against
the public policy of this state, and thus not limited by the two-year
filing period, is when fraud or concealment of material facts surround-
ing the death is involved." The court further stated:
We must extend a note of caution to those who read this opinion. It is not
sufficient for a plaintiff to complain that he didn't understand what he was
told, or that he did not know enough to do research. If situations such as
those were allowed to extend the two-year filing period, then virtually
every layperson could claim fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment.
Again, the purpose of the statute to act as a time constraint would be
destroyed. Instead, only cases where evidence of fraud, misrepresentation,
or concealment of material facts is presented will be sufficient to permit
78. 413 S.E.2d 178 (W. Va. 1991).
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an extension. On a practical note, cases filed beyond the statutory two-year
time period need only undergo limited discovery on the issue of fraud
before a summary judgment motion can be entertained. If it survives sum-
mary judgment, then the case proceeds and the issues of fraud and negli-
gence become questions for the jury."'
Thus, under the MPLA, fraudulent concealment tolls the two-year
limitation for wrongful death actions while the "discovery rule" does
not apply to wrongful death actions.
After the enactment of the MPLA, the West Virginia Supreme
Court held that the "discovery rule" applies to all tort actions. In Cart
v. Hager,82 the defendant began timbering plaintiff's property under
an oral agreement, but refused to sign a written contract. When the
plaintiff kicked him off the property until the contract was signed, the
defendant absconded with the timber. Since the plaintiff filed suit more
than two years later, the circuit court dismissed the case.
On appeal, the Supreme Court recognized that the statute of limi-
tations ordinarily begins to run when the injury is inflicted.83 To miti-
gate the harshness of the rule, the discovery rule tolls the statute until
the plaintiff knows or by reasonable diligence should know that he has
been injured and who is responsible. Noting that the rule had been
expanded to all types of cases," the court created a bright-line rule:
81. I& at 183.
82. 423 S.E.2d 644 (W. Va. 1992).
83. Id. at 646-47 (citing Jones v. Trustees of Bethany College, 351 S.E.2d 183, syl.
pt. 1 (W. Va. 1986)).
84. Id After reviewing the application of the discovery rule in medical malpractice
cases, the court cited an example of an appropriate application of the rule:
For example, if a surgeon leaves a surgical sponge inside of a patient, and
the patient discovers it five years later and immediately brings suit, that would fit
under the discovery rule. However, if the patient (with health insurance) bore
noticeable stomach pains for two more years before having a doctor examine him,
then he did not act with reasonable diligence and the "discovery rule" would not
protect the patient.
The discovery rule was expanded from medical to legal malpractice, products lia-
bility, faulty construction and invasion of privacy. d at 647-48 (citing Basham v. General
Shale, 377 S.E.2d 830 (W. Va. 1988); Shirkey v. Mackey, 399 S.E.2d 868 (W. Va. 1990)
(construction); Slack v. Kanawha County Hous. & Redevel. Auth., 423 S.E.2d 547 (W. Va.
1992) (invasion of privacy); Hickman v. Grover, 358 S.E.2d 810 (W. Va. 1987) (products
[Vol. 95:943
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[W]e hold today that the "discovery rule" is generally applicable to all
torts, unless there is a clear statutory prohibition of its application. Howev-
er, by declaring the existence of a "discovery rule" we do not eviscerate
the statute of limitations: the statute of limitations will apply unless the
handicaps to discovery at the time of the injury are great and are largely
the product of the defendant's conduct in concealing either the tort or the
wrongdoer's identity.
The "discovery rule," then, is to be applied with great circumspection
on a case-by-case basis only where there is a strong showing by the plain-
tiff that he was prevented from knowing of the claim at the time of the
injury. The general rule is that mere ignorance of the existence of a cause
of action or of the identity of the wrongdoer does not prevent the running
of a statute of limitations. In order to benefit from the rule, a plaintiff
must make a strong showing of fraudulent concealment, inability to com-
prehend the injury, or other extreme hardship.u
In a footnote, the court explained that "[f]raudulent concealment
would include concealment of the injury itself or the identity of the
tortfeasor."8 6 Inability to comprehend the injury would include leaving
a piece of surgical equipment in a patient or exposure to hazardous
chemicals where the effects were only detectable at a later time."
Applying the discovery rule, the court found that the plaintiff should
have known that defendant took his wood at the time of the conver-
sion.88 Accordingly, the plaintiff
suffered from none of the disabilities that a beneficiary of the "discovery
rule" must show in order to free himself from the demands of the statute
of limitations .... A reasonably diligent investigation would have turned
up the identities of [the defendants] sooner; indeed, [the plaintiff] still had
nearly a year after he discovered the identities of [the defendants] to bring
suit, yet he failed to do so. No hardship prevented [the plaintiff] from
discovering his injury or the identities of [the defendants].'
liability)).
85. Id at 648 (footnotes omitted).
86. Id at 648 n.13.
87. Id at 648 n.14.
88. Id at 649.
89. I at 649. The court noted that one of the defendants, who had actually abscond-
ed with the money, had never been located. As to this defendant, the court indicated in a
footnote that because he had gone into hiding, "it is quite possible that a suit against [him]
would be successful." Id
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More recently, the court discussed the MPLA statute of limitations
and discovery rule in Findo v. Hamilton.90 In Findo, the plaintiff al-
leged that the defendant-physician committed malpractice in treating
her for diverticulitis and perforation of the colon during a hospitaliza-
tion which ended on September 23, 1986. 'Claiming damages for treat-
ment required over the next five years, the plaintiff filed a complaint
alleging medical malpractice on January 8, 1991.91
The circuit court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment, finding that the plaintiff had discovered the alleged malprac-
tice in October 1987 and therefore had not filed her complaint within
the two-year MPLA statute of limitations.92 The plaintiff appealed,
arguing that a question of fact existed as to the date on which the
statute of limitations should have begun, asserting that the statute
should not begin to run "until the Plaintiff becomes aware that the
action in question constituted malpractice."'93 In this regard, the plain-
tiff argued that it was "possible to discover an injury without recogniz-
ing that malpractice was committed."94 The court agreed with the
plaintiff's theory, but stated:
[The statute did not begin to run when she merely discovered that addi-
tional treatment could possibly have been provided or that Dr. Hamilton
could have treated her more aggressively. Rather, as in Renner, the statute
began to run when the Appellant affirmatively recognized that malpractice
had been committed.95
In the face of this testimony, the plaintiff argued that since she
could not recall exactly what the physician told her about the malprac-
tice, "this uncertainty raises an issue of material facts precluding sum-
mary judgment and requiring the taking of additional evidence." 96 The
court replied:
90. Findo v. Hamilton, 428 S.E.2d 779 (W. 'Va. 1993).
91. Id at 780.
92. Id at 780-81.
93. Id. at 781.
94. Id
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A review of the Appellant's testimony leads to the inescapable con-
clusion that she was informed by Dr. Tyre in October 1987 that [the
defendant's] actions constituted malpractice. While some excerpts from the
transcript do indicate the Appellant's confusion about particular aspects of
her discussions regarding [the defendant's] treatment, she repeatedly an-
swers in the affirmative when questioned as to whether she was told in
October 1987 that [the defendant's] actions constituted malpracticeY
Noting that "[t]he principles requiring presentation to the jury need
not be stretched to the absurdity,""8 the court found "that the
Appellant's own testimony rendered it impossible to conclude that the
Appellant had filed her claim within the statute of limitations."
Despite the strong language in Cart, a confusing treatment of the
statute of limitations was seen in Ricottilli v. Summersville Memorial
Hospital1"° There, the court found that a claim for outrageous con-
duct or negligent infliction of emotional distress was governed by a
one-year statute of limitations.01 Although rejecting plaintiff's argu-
ment that the hospital's refusal to provide a complete autopsy report
was a continuing tort," 2 the court found that the statute did not be-
gin to run until the hospital filed a brief admitting that tissue analysis,
the basis for the plaintiff's assertion that the autopsy report was in-
complete, could not be performed because the body had been em-
balmed prior to the autopsy. Despite Cart, nowhere in Ricottilli does
the court analyze what actions the plaintiffs took to discover that the
autopsy could not be completed or whether the hospital actively con-
cealed facts from the plaintiffs.
Cart, Miller, and Findo shed considerable light on how tolling
doctrines are to apply in West Virginia. The burden upon the plaintiff
97. Id. at 783.
98. Id.
99. I. Compare Rener v. Asli, 280 S.E.2d 240 (V. Va. 1981) (when plaintiff be-
came aware of malpractice is jury question).
100. 425 S.E.2d 629 (W. Va. 1992).
101. Id. at 630.
102. "A wrongful act with consequential continuing damages is not a continuing tort."
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to claim relief under the discovery rule includes not only the failure to
discover, but proving that "some action by the defendant prevented the
plaintiff from knowing of the wrong at the time of the injury." The
discovery rule will still apply to the classic foreign object case, unless
the plaintiff waits too long in the face of evidence of a problem.
Plainly eliminated by Cart is the argument that the plaintiff did not
know he could sue, usually until he or she obtained a lawyer.103 Due
to its unique facts, Ricottilli's discussion of the statute of limitations
issues probably has little precedential value. Indeed, since the court
found that the action was filed within one year of CAMC's admission
that the autopsy could not be completed, the statute of limitations dis-
cussion in Ricottilli is dicta.1°4
E. Statute of Repose
A new twist added by the MPLA is a statute of repose, requiring
that all actions must be brought within ten years of the injury.105
This type of limitation has been held constitutional in similar statutes
and has been applied as an absolute bar to actions filed beyond the
period of repose.'06 Given the Miller v. Romero court's interpretation
of section 4 of the MPLA as applying only to "injury" actions, the
ten-year limit probably does not apply to wrongful death cases which
continue to be governed by a two-year limitation absent proof of
fraudulent concealment. 0 7
103. This could be termed "the theory of undiscovered intelligence." More accurate
than "discovery" of the injury, this might be described as discovery of a lawyer.
104. Given the court's application of a tolling doctrine-whether discovery or fraudulent
concealment is unclear-it was unnecessary to discuss whether the MPLA, one-, or two-year
statute of limitations applied.
105. MPLA § 4.
106. Gibson v. West Virginia Dep't of Highways, 406 S.E.2d 440 (W. Va. 1991).
Compare Christopher J. Volkrner, Note, Limitation of Actions-Disability of Infancy-Medical
Malpractice Statute Which Prevents Tolling of Limitations During Infancy Violates Due Pro-
cess Clause of Texas Constitution, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 208 (1983).
107. Given the Miller court's reliance upon public policy as the basis for engrafting the
fraudulent concealment rule onto West Virginia's wrongful death statute, it is an open ques-








To encourage "prompt resolution," the MPLA states that a "man-
datory" status conference be held between nine and twelve months
after the filing of answers.' The MPLA directs the parties to in-
form the court of the progress of the case, any contested issues of
fact, and the nature of anticipated discovery."w The plaintiff must
also certify that an expert has or will be retained to testify as to the
applicable standard of care or that no expert is required. If court rules
that an expert is necessary, the plaintiff must be given reasonable time
to obtain one." 0
The MPLA status conference is supposed to ensure that MPLA
actions are kept moving with judicial supervision. By requiring identi-
fication of experts by the plaintiff and allowing for sanctions, the
MPLA attempts to "weed out" baseless or frivolous claims within one
year of filing.
As a practical matter, the MPLA imposes no more restrictions
than could be applied under the West Virginia Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. Rule 16 provides for both discovery and scheduling conferences.
Expert designation can be handled under Rule 16, a motion to compel
designation of experts under Rule 26(b)(4),"' or a motion for sum-
mary judgment under Rule 56 based on the absence of necessary ex-
pert testimony." 2 Indeed, while the plaintiff can be required to des-
ignate an expert within a reasonable time, the MPLA does
not expressly provide for dismissal for noncompliance. Dismissal can
be accomplished by summary judgment under Rule 56,'13 a dismissal
108. MPLA § 6(a).
109. Id § 6(a)(1).
110. Id § 6(a)(2).
111. See Hulmes v. Catterson, 388 S.E.2d 313 (W. Va. 1989) (requiring parties to
disclose trial experts only within a reasonable time before trial); Michael v. Henry, 354
S.E.2d 590 (W. Va. 1987). Faxing the name to the opposition on a Sunday with trial to
commence Monday is not reasonable notice. Helmick v. Potomac Edison Co., 406 S.E.2d
700, 707 (W. Va. 1991).
112. See Hicks v. Chevy, 358 S.E.2d 202 (W. Va. 1987); Farley v. Meadows, 404
S.E.2d 537 (W. Va. 1991).
113. See Hicks v. Chevy, 358 S.E.2d 202 (W. Va. 1987).
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under Rule 37 for failure to comply with a discovery order,1 4 or
failure to prosecute under Rule 41.
By stating that the status conference be held no less than nine
months after the filing of answers, a question arises as to whether a
case can be dismissed for lack of an expert prior to the nine-month
period. Rule 56 allows the filing of a motion at any time. To avoid
summary judgment, the plaintiff would have to respond (1) with an
expert affidavit, 15 (2) that an expert is not required,1 6 or (3) that
discovery is not complete and an expert cannot be named.' 17
As suggested in Gilman v. Choi, the relationship between the
MPLA and the West Rules of Civil Procedure is probably one of
peaceful coexistence.1 The MPLA, therefore, would not as a matter
of law forbid dismissal of a case before the nine-month status confer-
ence. In practice, judges are reluctant to grant summary judgment
anyway, particularly if the case is new, the plaintiff needs discovery,
or the plaintiff needs time to name an expert.
Moreover, subsection 6(a) of the MPLA should not be interpreted
to forbid a. Rule 16 scheduling or discovery conference before nine
months. The language of section 6 of the MPLA envisions discovery
in progress and, as a practical matter, most cases are moving along
within nine months. Particularly where there is a statute of limitations
issue, an early conference should be held to schedule limited discovery
on the issue before the parties delve into liability and damages." 9
Most other cases could benefit from early scheduling of expert, discov-
ery, and motion deadlines. At the nine-month mark, the court can still
hold the MPLA status conference. As more state courts move towards
entering early scheduling orders (like the West Virginia federal district
courts), this may become the normal course of events in MPLA cases.
114. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Stephens, 425 S.E.2d 577 (W. Va. 1992).
115. See Rohrbough v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 719 F. Supp. 470 (N.D. W. Va. 1989), aff'd,
916 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
116. See Totten v. Adongay, 337 S.E.2d 2 (W. Va. 1985).
117. W. VA. R. Civ. P. 56(f); cf Hulmes v. Catterson, 388 S.E.2d 313 (W. Va. 1989).
118. 406 S.E.2d 200, 203-04 (W. Va. 1990); cf Sias v. W-P Coal Co., 408 S.E.2d
321, 329 (W. Va. 1991) (W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2, which encourages summary judgment,
coexists with W. VA. R. CIv. P. 56).
119. See Miller v. Romero, 413 S.E.2d 178 (W. Va. 1991).
[Vol. 95:943
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Indeed, the West Virginia Supreme Court has mandated that all cases,
except very complex ones, be brought to trial within eighteen
months. 120
The MPLA also grants circuit courts limited power to impose
sanctions on any party pursuing a frivolous or dilatory claim or de-
fense "for which there is no reasonable basis in fact or at law prior to
trial."121 The court may direct, in its final judgment, that the prevail-
ing party recover reasonable litigation expenses, excluding attorney's
fees and expenses.
The MPLA sanction provision tracks some of the language of
Rule 11 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides
for sanctions, including award of attorneys' fees and costs for frivolous
litigation.2 2 While Rule 11 applies only to pleadings, motions, and
other papers, the MPLA contains no such limitation; this grants broad-
er powers to judges, who can sanction the "pursuit" of frivolous
claims. The MPLA sanctions, however, are more limited than Rule 11,
as they do not include attorneys' fees, providing only for "reasonable
litigation expenses." Rule 11 is broader, allowing an appropriate sanc-
tion ranging from reprimand to attorneys fees to dismissal. Relation-
ship is probably one of peaceful coexistence. 123
G. Limits on Noneconomic Damages
The MPLA "caps" damages for noneconomic loss at one million
dollars per occurrence. Noneconomic loss is defined as "losses includ-
ing, but not limited to, pain, suffering, mental anguish and grief."" u
Noneconomic loss does not include pecuniary damages such as past
120. Administrative Order, Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, Rule on Time
Standards for Processing Circuit Court Cases 2 (June 30, 1992).
121. MPLA § 6(b).
122. Daily Gazette v. Canady, 332 S.E.2d 262 (W. Va. 1985); Thomas J. Hurney, Jr.
& W. Scott Campbell, Rule 11 Sanctions in State and Federal Courts in West Virginia, 90
W. VA. L. REV. 417 (1987-88).
123. Gilman v. Choi, 406 S.E.2d 200 (V. Va.. 1991); see also Sias v. W-P Coal Co.,
408 S.E.2d 321, 329 (V. Va. 1991).
124. MPLA § 2(g).
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and future medical bills, lost earnings, and other calculable or out of
pocket damages.1'2
The MPLA cap was held constitutional by the West Virginia Su-
preme Court of Appeals in Robinson v. Charleston Area Medical Cen-
ter, Inc. 126 In Robinson, the defendant obstetrician was found negli-
gent in delivering the plaintiff's son who suffered severe brain damage.
The jury awarded damages totalling $15.25 million, including $10
million for future medical care, $750,000 for lost future eainlings, $2.5
million for past, present, and future loss of enjoyment of life and other
noneconomic damages to the infant, and $1 million to each parent for
noneconomic damages. The Robinson court found that the MPLA cap
applied "per occurrence"; in other words, for each injury, only a mil-
lion dollars could be awarded, regardless of the number of persons
claiming damages as a result of the injury. The cap "applies as one
overall limit to the aggregated claims of all plaintiffs against a health
care provider, rather than applying to each plaintiff separately." 127
125. For example, in Robinson v. Charleston Area Medical Ctr., Inc., 414 S.E.2d 877
(W. Va. 1991), a ten million dollar award consisting of lost future medical bills was af-
firmed. See infra table 1. Lost future damages, including medical bills, must be proven to a
reasonable certainty, Jordan v. Bero, 210 S.E.2d 618 (W. Va. 1974), and must be reduced
to present value. Adkins v. Foster, 421 S.E.2d 271 (W. Va. 1992). Only medical bills re-
lated to the injury may be recovered. Abdulla v. Pittsburgh & Weirton Bus Co., 213 S.E.2d
810 (W. Va. 1975); see also Lester v. SJ. Alexander, 193 S.E.2d 860 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972).
Medical bills must also be reasonable and necessary. Long v. City of Weirton, 214 S.E.2d
832 (W. Va. 1975); W. VA. CODE § 57-5-4j (Supp. 1992) (proof that bills were incurred
because of illness is prima facie evidence they were reasonable and necessary).
126. 414 S.E.2d 877 (W. Va. 1991). Other states' caps have also been upheld. Adams
v. Children's Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W.2d 898 (Mo. 1992) (Missouri $430,000 cap); Etheridge
v. Medical Ctr. Hosp., 376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989) (Virginia $750,000 cap). Rose v. Doctors
Hosp., 801 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1990) (limit in wrongful death cases constitutional). But see
Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765 (Ohio 1991) (Ohio $200,000 cap unconstitutional). See
generally Karin A. Olson, Survey of Constitutional Arguments in Medical Malpractice Award
Limit Cases, 23 J. HEALTH & HosP. L. 328 (1990). Nonetheless, some authors are highly
critical of caps as not really beneficially affecting insurance or health care costs. Franklin
D. Cleckley & Govind Haiharan, A Free Market Analysis of the Effects of Medical Mal-
practice Damage Caps: Can We Afford to Live with Inefficient Doctors?, 94 W. VA. L.
REV. 11 (1991). It is suggested caps are more likely due to good lobbying than solid facts.
Id. at 70-71. Indeed, in Robinson, the West Virginia court hinted that any reduction in the
amount of the cap might render it unconstitutional.
127. Robinson, 414 S.E.2d at 888.
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Applying the cap, the court stated that awards in excess of the
limit should be reduced by "eliminating awards to secondary claimants,
such as for consortium, prior to eliminating any excessive amount for
the noneconomic loss incurred by the physically injured person."128
Accordingly, the court eliminated the awards to the parents and re-
duced the child's award to $1 million.
TABLE 1
APPLICATION OF MPLA CAP IN
ROBINSON V. CHARLESTON AREA MEDICAL CENTER, INC.
JURY AWARD CAP APPLIED
NON- NON-
ECONOMIC ECONOMIC ECONOMIC ECONOMIC
$10,000,000 $10,000,000





SUBTOTAL $10,750,000 $4,500,000 $10,750,000 $1,000,000
TOTAL $15,250,000 = F $11,750,000
The significance of the MPLA cap is somewhat overshadowed by
the large award for actual loss ($11.75 million) affirmed in Robinson.
Compared to Robinson, it is ironic that in Roberts v. Stevens Clin-
128. Id. at 889 n.11; see also Federal Kemper Ins. Co. v. Karlet, 428 S.E.2d 60
(W. Va. 1993) (children's claims for loss of consortium are derivative; therefore, they are
not separate claims for purposes of insurance coverage).
1993]
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ic,12 9 a pre-MPLA case, a ten million dollar award was reduced to
three million dollars by the West Virginia Supreme Court.13° Howev-
er, in cases involving lower actual losses, the cap can have a more
profound effect on the amount of damages awarded, since nonpecuni-
ary damages are often the bulk of awards to plaintiffs. The cap has
also gained significance since the supreme court has recently moved
away from its traditional disdain for emotional distress awards, sug-
gesting that plaintiffs may recover such damages resulting from negli-
gence in some circumstances.
131
As to claimants other than the injured party, the Robinson "triage"
of claims-trimming the noninjured party's awards first-is highly
significant given the expansion of liability in West Virginia for loss of
consortium by children32  and emotional distress for close family
member "bystanders.' 1
33
129. 345 S.E.2d 791 (W. Va. 1986).
130. L at 793.
131. In Ricottilli, the court found that "an individual may recover for the negligent
infliction of emotional distress upon a showing of facts sufficient to guarantee that the
emotional damage claim is not spurious." Heldreth v. Marrs, 425 S.E.2d 157 (W. Va. 1992)
(bystander recovery for emotional distress); Arbogast v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 427
S.E.2d 461 (W. Va. 1993); Johnson v. West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889
(W. Va. 1991) (fear of AIDS); Bennett v. 3 C Coal Co., 379 S.E.2d 388 (X. Va. 1989)
(disturbance of grave site); see generally Scott D. Marrs, Mind Over Body: Trends Regard-
ing the Physical Injury Requirement in Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress and "Fear
of Disease" Cases, 28 TORT & INS. L.J. 1 (1992); Frances C. Whiteman, Toxic Emotional
Distress Claims: The Emerging Trend for Recovery Absent Physical Injury, 20 CAP. U. L.
REv. 995 (1991); John L. Ropiequet, Emotional Distress Claims in Medical Malpractice
Cases, FOR THE DEFENSE, Apr. 1990, at 13; see also Koeller v. Cook County, 535 N.E.2d
1118 (Il. App. Ct. 1984). In Kelly v. Resource Hous. of Am., Inc. 615 A.2d 423 (Pa.
Super. 1992), the court affirmed the dismissal of a bystander claim in part because she vol-
untarily observed the treatment.
132. Belcher v. Goins, 400 S.E.2d 830 (W. Va. 1991); see also Daniel T. Yon, Note,
Belcher v. Goins: West Virginia Joins the Distinct Minority of Jurisdictions in Recognizing
a Claim for Loss of Parental Consortium, 94 W. VA. L. REV. 261 (1991). Loss of consor-
tium between spouses has been long recognized. King v. Bittinger, 231 S.E.2d 239 (W. Va.
1976).
133. Heldreth v. Marts, 425 S.E.2d 157 (W. Va. 1992); see also Arbogast v.
Nationnwide Mut. Ins. Co., 427 S.E.2d 461 (W. Va. 1993).
974"
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H. Joint & Several Liability
The MPLA changes West Virginia law regarding joint and several
liability. Like other actions, the jury must allocate fault among all
parties who may be at fault. 134 Any MPLA defendant bearing more
than twenty-five percent of the liability attributable to all defendants is
to be held jointly and severally liable.135 Any MPLA defendant with
less than twenty-five percent is only severally liable.136 While the
MPLA joint and several defendants are "liable to each plaintiff for all
or any part of the total dollar amount awarded regardless of the per-
centage of negligence attributed to him,"'137 the MPLA several defen-
dants pay only their proportionate share of any verdict. 138 This provi-
sion changes prior law, under which each defendant would have been
jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff, retaining rights of contribu-
tion among defendants. 13
9
I. Contribution, Indemnity & Settlement
The MPLA codifies the rights of contribution and indemnity
among defendants in MPLA actions:
A right of contribution exists in favor of each defendant who has paid to a
plaintiff more than the percentage of the total dollar amount awarded at-
tributable to him relative to the percentage of negligence attributable to
him. The total amount of recovery for contribution is limited to the
amount paid by the defendant to a plaintiff in excess of the percentage of
the total dollar amount awarded attributable to him.'4
134. See Bowman v. Barnes, 282 S.E.2d 613 (W. Va. 1981); Kodym v. Frazier, 412
S.E.2d 219 (W. Va. 1991).
135. MPLA § 9(b).
136. Id. § 9(b)-(c).
137. Id. § 9(c).
138. See id.
139. Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979); Reager v.
Anderson, 371 S.E.2d 619 (W. Va. 1988).
140. MPLA § 9(c).
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This provision is consistent with prior West Virginia law which
maintained the right of contribution for any defendant paying more
than the pro rata share of liability assigned by the jury since the
adoption of comparative fault.
41
The MPLA also codifies the "good faith settlement" rule: "No
right of contribution exists against any defendant who entered into a
good faith settlement with the plaintiff prior to the jury's report of its
findings to the court or the court's findings as to the total dollar
amount awarded as to damages."' 42 In Smith v. Monongahela Power
Co.,143 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals defined a good
faith settlement. While Smith is not an MPLA case, it is instructive as
to how the court would most likely construe the MPLA's adoption of
the good faith settlement rule.
Settlements are presumptively made in good faith. A defendant seek-
ing to establish that a settlement made by a plaintiff and a joint tortfeasor
lacks good faith has the, burden of doing so by clear and convincing evi-
dence. Because the primary consideration is whether the settlement ar-
rangement substantially impairs the ability of remaining defendants to
receive a fair trial, a settlement lacks good faith only upon a showing of
corrupt intent by the settling plaintiff and joint tortfeasor, in that the settle-
ment involved collusion, dishonesty, fraud or other tortious conduct.'"
Smith places in circuit courts the sound discretion to determine
whether a settlement has been made in good faith. The court directed
that the trial court should focus not on whether the settlement fell
within a reasonable range of the settling tortfeasor's proportional share
of fault, "but whether the circumstances indicate that the nonsettling
tortfeasor was substantially deprived of a fair trial because of corrupt
141. Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979); Sitzes v.
Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 289 S.E.2d 679 (W. Va. 1982); Reager v. Anderson, 371
S.E.2d 619 (W. Va. 1988).
142. MPLA § 9(c); see Board of Educ. of McDowell County v. Zando, Martin &
Milstead, Inc., 390 S.E.2d 796 (W. Va. 1990); Cook v. Stansell, 411 S.E.2d 844 (W. Va.
1991); Cline v. White, 393 S.E.2d 923 (W. Va. 1990).
143. 429 S.E.2d 643 (W. Va. 1993).
144. 1l at 651-52.
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behavior on the part of the plaintiff and the settling tortfeasor or
tortfeasors.' ' 145 The court highlighted several factors relevant to a de-
termination of whether a settlement lacks good faith:
(1) the amount of the settlement in comparison to the potential liability of
the settling tortfeasor at the time of settlement, in view of such consider-
ations as (a) a recognition that a tortfeasor should pay less in settlement
than after an unfavorable trial verdict, (b) the expense of litigation, (c) the
probability that the plaintiff would win at trial, and (d) the insurance limits
and solvency of all joint tortfeasors; (2) whether the settlement is support-
ed by consideration; (3) whether the motivation of the settling plaintiff and
settling tortfeasor was to single out a non-settling defendant or defendants
for wrongful tactical gain; and (4) whether there exists a relationship, such
as family ties or an employer-employee relationship, naturally conducive to
collusion. 6
The Supreme Court gave the trial court broad discretion as to
what evidence to consider, stating that a review of discovery docu-
ments and affidavits should be sufficient; however, "[t]he trial court
may, in its discretion, conduct a hearing on the issue, but it is not
required to do so. " 147 Finally, pretrial settlements by parties under
the MPLA are handled in the same manner as under existing West
Virginia law, leaving considerable discretion to the trial court as to
what information is transmitted to the jury.14
IR. HOSPITALS AND VIcARIOus LIABiLITY
While the MPLA restricts the liability of hospitals, its provisions
do not appear to change the law of agency, the basis of most hospital
cases. The MPLA extends its protection to officers, employees or
agents of healthcare providers acting in the course and scope of their
duties. While the MPLA defines "healthcare providers," it does not
define officers, employees, or agents, leaving these terms to be inter-
145. I at 652.
146. Id
147. Id.
148. See Fortney v. AI-Haji, 425 S.E.2d 264 (W. Va. 1992).
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preted consistent with existing law. Existing law, therefore, governs
agency questions.
A. Employees
Hospitals are liable for negligent acts of their employees (nurses,
technicians, and other nonphysician health providers) under the doctrine
of respondeat superior.149 West Virginia law is replete with cases
describing the liability of hospitals for the negligent acts of its em-
ployees. For example, nurses have a duty to follow orders, 150 to
question improper orders,15 1 and to monitor and report condition of
patient.1 52 A fairly common claim against nurses occurs when an el-
derly or incompetent patient is injured falling out of bed.153 Other
employees, such as radiologic technicians, must also perform their
work in a reasonably prudent manner as required by the MPLA.154
B. Agents
1. General Rule
Generally, nonemployee physicians are treated as independent
contractors for whom the hospital is not liable. "[I]n most cases doc-
149. Cross v. Trapp, 294 S.E.2d 446 (W. Va. 1982); Duling v. Bluefield Sanitorium,
142 S.E.2d 754 (W. Va. 1965). Meade v. St. Francis Hosp., 74 S.E.2d 405 (W. Va. 1953);
see also Carmen D. Rasmussen, Note, Hospital Liability Related to Understaffing of Nursing
Services: Walking the Fine Line Between Respondeat Superior and Corporate Negligence, 94
W. VA. L. REV. 1083 (1992); Barbara R. Benninger, Note, Nursing Malpractice-The
Nurse's Duty to Follow Orders, 90 W. VA. L. REv. 1291 (1988).
150. See W. VA. CODE § 30-7-1 (1993); W. VA. CODE § 30-7-15a (1993) (nurse's
prescriptive authority); see generally Barbara R. Benninger, Note, Nursing Malpractice-The
Nurse's Duty to Follow Orders, 90 W. VA. L. REv. 1291 (1988).
151. Utter v. United Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 236 S.E.2d 213 (W. Va. 1977); see also Ress v.
Abbott N.W. Hosp., 438 N.W.2d 727 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (good faith refusal to follow
order is not misconduct).
152. Utter, 236 S.E.2d at 214, 216; see also Hiatt v. Groce, 523 P.2d 320 (Kan.
1974).
153. See Howard S. Rubenstein et al., Standards of Medical Care Based on Consensus
Rather than Evidence: The Case of Routine Bedrail Use for the Elderly, 11 L. MED. &
HEALTH CARE 271 (1983).
154. See Fortney v. AI-Hajj, 425 S.E.2d 264 (W. Va. 1992).
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tors with hospital privileges are not employees of the hospital, but
rather independent contractors who must be granted permission to
admit patients and make use of the hospital's resources." 5 5 "The fact
that a physician is a member of the medical staff of the hospital is not
determinative of the physician's status as an agent or servant of the
hospital.' S
6
Historically, physicians and nurses were considered to be independent
contractors for whose acts hospitals were not responsible because the
courts perceived the hospital as merely furnishing the location where pa-
tients could receive care and treatment from their private physicians. The
courts reasoned that a layman could not control a physician due to the
inherent skill and judgment needed in the practice of medicine. Due to this
lack of control, the courts found that the hospital could not be held liable
for the physician's actions.'
Applying this principle, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia has indicated that hospitals are generally not liable where the
plaintiff claims lack of informed consent by a privately retained phy-
sician who is a member of the medical staff."" In Cross v. Trapp,
the court held:
When a patient asserts that a particular method of medical treatment, such
as surgery, was performed by the patient's privately retained physician
without the patient's consent, the hospital where that treatment was per-
formed will ordinarily not be held liable to the patient upon the consent
155. Oliverio, supra note 1, at 739 (citing Timothy S. Jost, The Necessary and Proper
Role of Regulation to Assure the Quality of Health Care, 25 Hous. L. REv. 525, 553
(1988)). Oliverio suggests that "[g]enerally, hospitals are responsible for the negligence of
their staff members." Ia at 745. As to the physicians on the medical staff, this is not true
unless agency is established or liability is imposed via a theory of negligent screening or
credentialing.
156. Jones v. Dinsmore, Slip Op. No. 5:85-0084 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 4, 1987) (citing
Payne, Recent Developments Affecting a Hospital's Liability for Negligence of Physicians, 18
S. TEx. LJ. 389, 342 (1976)).
157. David J. Oakley & Eileen M. Kelly, HMO Liability for Malpractice of Member
Physicians: The Case of IPA Model HMOs, 23 TORT & INS. L.J. 624, 626 (1988) (foot-
notes omitted).
158. Cross v. Trapp, 294 S.E.2d 446 (W. Va. 1982); see also Bailey v. Fletcher, No.
10857, 1988 WL 120130 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov 3, 1988).
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issue, where the physician involved was not an agent or employee of the
hospital during the period in question.
159
Recently, in Belcher v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc.,160
the court refused to move away from Cross v. Trapp, stating:
In this case, the record is clear that the employees of the hospital were
aware of the discussions between Dr. Ayoubi and Larry's parents, and that
it was apparent that Larry's parents consented to the treatment given. Fur-
thermore, there is no dispute that the appellee Ayoubi was privately re-
tained, and the appellants could have chose to not seek his treatment for
Larry.
161
This general rule, however, does not absolve hospitals from vicarious
liability where a physician who is the hospital's agent fails to obtain
informed consent. It is in the area of ostensible or apparent agency
where West Virginia has judicially expanded the vicarious liability of
hospitals for physicians who are members of its medical staff.
2. Ostensible or Apparent Agency
If a physician is found to be an agent, the hospital may be vicari-
ously liable for his or her negligence.162 Applying the doctrine of os-
tensible agency, the West Virginia Supreme Court has imposed vicari-
159. 294 S.E.2d at 447. Under pre-MPLA West Virginia law, physicians had to dis-
close risks involved with treatment, alternative treatment methods, risks of alternatives, and
results of going untreated. West Virginia applied the patient-need standard, under which
disclosure is governed by information required by the reasonable patient to make decisions
regarding treatment. Adams v. El-Bash, 338 S.E.2d 381 (W. Va. 1985); Cross v. Trapp, 294
S.E.2d 446 (W. Va. 1982).
160. 422 S.E.2d 827 (W. Va. 1992). In Belcher, the court expanded the doctrine of
informed consent to require physicians to obtain consent from "mature minors." Even though
the decedent in Belcher was seventeen and his parents consented to a "DO NOT RESUSCI-
TATE" order, the court found a question of fact as to whether consent should have been
obtained from the minor decedent l at 446.
161. Al at 834; see also Jane GCreenlaw, Should Hospitals Be Responsible for Informed
Consent?, 11 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE, Sept. 1983, at 173.
162. Thomas v. Raleigh Gen. Hosp., 358 S.E.2d 222 (W. Va. 1987); Cross v. Trapp,
294 S.E.2d 446, 459 (W. Va. 1982); John D. Hodson, Annotation, Liability of Hospital or
Sanitorium for Negligence of Physician or Surgeon, 51 A.L.R.4th 235 (1987).
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ous liability on hospitals for the negligence of nonemployee physicians
where the hospital provides the physician and leaves the patient with
no choice as to whether to hire the physician, and where the hospital
holds the physician out as an employee.
Liability for physicians not "chosen" by the patient was applied in
Thomas v. Raleigh General Hospital,63 an anesthesia malpractice
case where the plaintiff sued the hospital, the anesthesiologist, and the
surgeon. After the trial court granted summary judgment, the plaintiff
appealed.
The Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for the surgeon,
finding that he "had nothing to do with the anesthesia procedure...
[and] exercised no control whatsoever over [the anesthesiologist or his
employee]."" The court stated:
We reject the captain of the ship doctrine. The trend toward special-
ization in medicine has created situations where surgeons do not always
have the right to control all personnel within the operating room .... An
assignment of liability based on a theory of actual control more realisti-
cally reflects the actual relationship which exists in a modem operating
room.
1 5
The court, however, found that the hospital could be held vicari-
ously liable for the negligence of the anesthesiologist. "Where a patient
goes to a hospital seeking medical services and is forced to rely on
the hospital's choice of physician to render those services, the hospital
may be found vicariously liable for the physician's negligence." 1
Since the anesthesiologist had an exclusive contract with the hospital,
all patients having surgery had to use him for anesthesia. Based on
this lack of choice, the court found a question of fact as to whether
the hospital was vicariously liable.
163. 358 S.E.2d 222 (W. Va. 1987).
164. Id. at 224.
165. IcL at 225; accord Franklin v. Gupa, 567 A.2d 524 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990).
Compare Mozingo v. Pitt County Memorial Hosp., Inc., 415 S.E.2d 341 (N.C. 1992) (defen-
dant had responsibility to supervise resident physicians).
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The Raleigh General rule was confirmed in a footnote in a later
case, Belcher v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc.,167 where the
court succinctly stated "Liability may be imposed on a hospital where
the patient did not choose the treating doctor, but is forced to rely on
the hospital's choice."
16
Vicarious liability for nonemployee physicians was further expand-
ed in Torrence v. Kusminsky. 69 In Torrence, after arriving at the
emergency room complaining of severe abdominal pain, the plaintiff
was admitted as a surgical service patient because she did not have
her own surgeon.170 Two residents diagnosed appendicitis and noti-
fied the defendant physician who immediately came to the hospital to
assist in surgery.' 7 ' The plaintiff alleged that the doctors negligently
misdiagnosed and treated her. A jury awarded a verdict against the
hospital and the physician.
The hospital appealed, arguing that it was not vicariously liable
because the physician was an independent contractor who was an em-
ployee of West Virginia University, received no compensation from the
hospital, whose billing was handled by WVU Health Service, and
because the plaintiff chose him as her surgeon. The plaintiff countered
that "she did not select [the defendant] as her physician, but had no
choice but to accept his services."
The court held that the hospital was liable for the doctor's negli-
gence under the doctrine of ostensible agency:
First, the changing role of the hospital in society creates a likelihood that
patients will look to the institution rather than the individual physician for
care .... In today's world, a patient may frequently go to the hospital
seeking a wide range of services rather than personal treatment by a par-
ticular physician. The second factor justifying a finding of "ostensible
167. 422 S.E.2d 827 (W. Va. 1992).
168. IA at 834 n.8.
169. 408 S.E.2d 684 (W. Va. 1991).
170. Surgical service was a teaching service for residents at the hospital. Under this
program residents gain experience and training while working on emergency room patients.
The program had several physicians, including the defendant Dr. Kusminsky, who supervised
these residents on a daily basis. Moreover, the supervising physicians had to be on-call for
the emergency room on a rotational basis. Id at 688-89.
171. I& at 689.
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agency" relationship between hospital and physician exists where the hospi-
tal "holds out" the physician as its employee .... A "holding out" occurs
when the hospital acts or omits to act in some way which leads the patient
to a reasonable belief he is being treated by the hospital or one of its em-
ployees.'
Applying this rule to the relationship between the defendant physician
and the hospital, the court stated:
We find the application of ostensible agency particularly compelling
when a patient seeks services from an emergency room. In such circum-
stances, there is often no time to arrange for the services of a private
physician, and, in effect, the patient has no other choice but the emergency
room. Frequently, the situation is tense, with the patient's family and
friends in an emotional state. To hold that the hospital, after offering
emergency services, should avoid any subsequent liability by claiming that
those who render such assistance are not the hospital's employees defies
the logical and reasonable expectations of those who seek such services.
Therefore, we hold that where a hospital makes emergency room
treatment available to serve the public as an integral part of its facilities,
the hospital is estopped to deny that the physicians and other medical
personnel on duty providing treatment are its agents. Regardless of any
contractual arrangements with so-called independent contractors, the hospi-
tal is liable to the injured patient for acts of malpractice committed in its
emergency room, so long as the requisite proximate cause and damages are
present.
[The defendant] was an ostensible agent of [the hospital] under the
circumstances of this case. [The plaintiff] went to the emergency room at
[the hospital] because she was seeking the services of that institution rather
than a particular doctor. After she arrived, because she did not have her
own surgeon, she was assigned as a surgical service patient. As this type
of patient, [the plaintiff] received her initial care from two residents who
were undeniably agents of the hospital. When the two residents felt that
[the plaintiff] needed an operation, they called their supervisor, [the defen-
dant], the physician who was on call for the emergency room that particu-
lar evening. Had [the plaintiff] come to the hospital some other night, she
might have been operated on by a different surgeon. Moreover, [the defen-
dant] used the staff, facilities, and supplies of [the hospital] during the
surgical procedure. Finally, there is no evidence in the record that [the
hospital] did anything that would lead [the plaintiff] to believe that [the
172. Id. at 691-92.
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defendant] was an independent contractor and not an employee of the
hospital.
173
Torrence, like Raleigh General, also suggested that hospitals may
be liable for physicians they supply, such as pathologists, radiologists,
and anesthesiologistS, "all of whom share the common characteristic of
being supplied through the hospital rather than being selected by the
patient.
'' 74
The concept -of liability for physicians "held out" as employees
had previously been mentioned in Raleigh General. The court suggest-
ed that hospitals could be liable for "managers," and found a factual
question as to whether the physician was a "manager" of anesthesiolo-
gy at the hospital because he was Director of Respiratory Services and
Chief of Anesthesiology and was given an office and a stipend for the
performance of these duties. "A hospital cannot absolve itself from
liability of a treating physician where that physician was a 'manager'
of the hospital." 175
The court cited Vaughn v. Memorial Hospital76 as support for
the "manager" theory. In Vaughn, the hospital argued it was "not
responsible for any default on the part of physicians ... they being
independent agents."'" The court stated:
A hospital incorporated and conducted for private gain, for the benefit of
its stockholders, is liable in damages to its patients for the negligence or
misconduct of its officers and employees .... The purely private charac-
ter of the defendant is practically admitted; the certificate of incorporation
under the laws of West Virginia being in evidence in the case. The capital
invested is like capital invested in any other corporation conducted for
profit. In its contract it stands upon the same basis as any other contractor,
173. Id at 692; accord Kashisian v. Port, 481 N.W.2d 277 (Wis. 1992). Compare
Ferguson v. Allied Anesthesia, Inc., No. 88AP-483, 1989 WL 52981 (Ohio Ct. App. May
16, 1989) (no vicarious liability absent proof of detrimental reliance).
174. Torrence, 408 S.E.2d at 691 (citing Paintsville Hosp. Co. v. Rose, 683 S.W.2d
255 (Ky. 1985)).
175. Id at 225 (citing Vaughn v. Memorial Hosp., 130 S.E. 481, 482 (w. Va.), later
appeal, 136 S.E. 837 (W. Va. 1925)).
176. 130 S.E.2d 481 (W. Va. 1925).
177. Id at 481.
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and, as to employees and third persons, it is subject to the same general
rule, respondeat superior.
It appeared in evidence that said doctors are the managers of the
defendant hospital; that the x-ray machine used in the hospital for exami-
nation of this plaintiff's injury was the property of the institution. Under
these conditions, the authorities cited hold that the said defendant cannot
absolve itself from the obligation it owed to the patient to furnish him
proper treatment, on the claim that the physicians who treated him, at its
instance, were independent contractors. 7 '
The court also found that the defendant hospital had a contract with
the plaintiff's employer, a coal company, to treat its injured employees
and that the expenses were paid from the Workers' Compensation
Fund. 179
Both Raleigh General and Vaughn are sketchy as to the definition
of a "manager" of a hospital. Indeed, Vaughn suggests that the doctors
involved were, in fact, owners or stockholders of the for-profit hospital
and merely used equipment owned by the hospital. The focus in
Vaughn, therefore, was on the private, for-profit nature of the hospital
and more likely an effort to avoid charitable immunity than to estab-
lish the broad proposition for which it was cited in Raleigh General.
Indeed, because of the contractual relationship between the hospital
and the coal company to provide medical care, Vaughn really stands
more for imposing liability where the patient had no choice in select-
ing the physician.
West Virginia's brand of ostensible agency, as applied in Raleigh
General and Torrence, has resulted in a somewhat fuzzy delineation of
just who a hospital is liable for. Employed physicians are easy-
respondeat superior controls. Raleigh General reflects an inconsistent
shifting of liability. While on one hand rejecting the "captain of the
ship" doctrine as not reflecting the way things really work in operating
rooms, the court expanded the liability of hospitals to encompass acts
of physicians whose medical practice they do not control. The concept
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that a patient is deemed not to "choose" a physician necessarily as-
sumes that patients are never cognizant of who is providing treatment
and why. Indeed, unlike the application of ostensible agency in other
contexts, the court ignores the requirement of actual reliance by the
patient in the hospital scenario.180
This makes the most sense in the context of the emergency room,
where the patient is taken or seeks treatment on an emergency basis
from the hospital, even though the emergency room may be staffed by
a group of doctors with a contract to provide emergency services to
the hospital or by members of the medical staff who provide emergen-
cy room coverage on a rotating basis. Torrence, however, seems to
stretch the concept to its limit-not only can the hospital be liable for
emergency room doctors, it may also be liable for the negligence of
other physicians who received specialty referrals."' 1 Torrence, howev-
er, is best understood as an extension of Raleigh General: Where the
patient cannot choose a physician other than one designated by the
hospital, vicarious liability will lie. Neither Torrence nor Raleigh Gen-
eral dictates vicarious liability for referrals, even from the emergency
room, to private specialty physicians not designated by the hospital
through an exclusive contract or special arrangement. Moreover, prior
contact with the physician by the patient, or referrals made by the
patients' personal physician should not impose liability upon the hospi-
tal.182
The practical problem presented by the loose application of osten-
sible agency is that hospitals are simply named as defendants based on
broad allegations of "agency." Since Raleigh General and Torrence
suggest that the question is one for the jury, early summary judgment
180. See Paintsville Hosp. Co. v. Rose, 683 S.W.2d 255, 258 (Ky. 1985) (Vance, J.,
dissenting); Brown v. Coastal Emergency Servs., Inc., 354 S.E.2d 632 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987)
(ostensible agency); Hardy v. Brantley, 471 So. 2d 358 (Miss. 1985); see generally DAVID
W. LouisELL & HAROLD WILLIAMS, MEDIcAL MALPRACTICE § 15.07[1] (1992).
181. Indeed, in Rine v. Irisari, 420 S.E.2d 541 (W. Va. 1992), the court held that "a
negligent physician is liable for the aggravation of injuries resulting from subsequent negli-
gent medical treatment, if foreseeable, where that subsequent medical treatment is undertaken
to mitigate the harm caused by the physician's own negligence." Id at syl. pt. 2.
182. See STANLEY S. SCHWARTZ & NORMAN D. TUCKER, HANDLING BIRTH TRAUMA
CASES § 2.13 (1992).
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is not likely, leaving the hospital with the choice of spending legal
fees or settling, even where its only liability is solely vicarious. In this
circumstance, hospitals are named as a sort of "excess insurer" in large
damage cases.18 3 A settlement with the physician in this circumstance
should release the hospital.'"
IV. LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENT GRANTING OF
PRIVILEGES OR SUPERVISION
Hospitals must exercise reasonable care in evaluating the qualifica-
tions of persons who seek privileges to perform medical services in the
hospital and review the treatment rendered by such persons. 5 The
failure to carry out this duty may lead to liability for negligence when
injury results.1 86
Hospitals have been held liable when the failure to properly scruti-
nize a physician's application results in unreasonable risk of harm to
its patients.'87 In Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hospital,188
the plaintiff claimed the hospital knew or should have known that the
physician ,was not qualified to perform orthopedic surgery. The court
held the hospital to the standard of care exercised in similar situations
by other hospitals8 9 and outlined the steps that a hospital should
take when selecting medical staff and granting specialized privileges:
The credentials committee (or committee of the whole) must investigate
the qualifications of applicants .... [A] hospital should, at a minimum,
183. XaL § 2.2.
184. Atldnson v. Wichita Clinic, 763 P.2d 1085 (Kan. 1980).
185. See Elam v. College Park Hosp., 183 Cal Rptr. 156 (Ct. App. 1982); Holton v.
Resurrection Hosp., 410 N.E.2d 969 (111. App. Ct. 1980); Bell v. Sharp Cabrillo Hosp., 260
Cal. Rptr. 37 (Ct. App. 1989); Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d
326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (II1. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966); see generally LOUISELL
& WH.LIAMS, supra note 179, § 15.06[1]; Andrea G. Nadel, Annotation, Hospital's Liability
for Negligence in Failing to Review or Supervise Treatment Given by Doctor, or to Require
Consultation, 12 A.L.R.4th 57 (1982).
186. Holton, 410 N.E.2d at 973.
187. Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hosp., 301 N.W.2d 156 (Wis. 1981); Sheffield
v. Zilis, 316 S.E.2d 493 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984).
188. 301 N.W.2d 156 (Wis. 1981).
189. a at 171 (citing Mossey v. St. Luke's Hosp., 218 N.W.2d 514 (Wis. 1974)).
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require completion of the application and verify the accuracy of the
applicant's statements, especially in regard to his medical education, train-
ing and experience. Additionally, it should: (1) solicit information from the
applicant's peers, including those not referenced in his application, who are
knowledgeable about his education, training, experience, health, competence
and ethical character, (2) determine if the applicant is currently licensed to
practice in this state and if his licensure or registration has been or is
currently being challenged; and (3) inquire whether the applicant has been
involved in any adverse malpractice action and whether he has experienced
a loss of medical organization membership or medical privileges or mem-
bership at any other hospital."9°
The plaintiff must also prove causation: that but for the hospital's
lack of care in selecting the physician, the physician would not have
been granted staff privileges and the plaintiff would not have been
injured.191 Actual knowledge by the hospital of the incompetency of
a physician is not necessary; rather, the hospital will be charged with
knowledge of information available through a reasonable inquiry into
the physician's qualifications and background."
It is not enough that the hospital failed to adequately verify the
physician's credentials; instead, it must be shown that had the hospital
made adequate inquiry, it would have denied the physician's applica-
tion for privileges. 93 In Ferguson v. Gonyaw,1" the court found
that the hospital did not act in a reasonably prudent manner in check-
ing a physician's qualifications to be a staff member at the hospital.
However, the court determined that even if the hospital had checked
the physician's qualifications, it would have found him to be a quali-
fied osteopathic surgeon. Consequently, the court affirmed a directed
verdict for the hospital.
190. I at 174.
191. Albain v. Flower Hosp., 553 N.E.2d 1038, 1046 (Ohio 1990).
192. Johnson, 301 N.W.2d at 173.
193. Ferguson v. Gonyaw, 236 N.W.2d 543 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975). Cases discussing
the discoverability of applications and evaluations of defendant physicians in medical mal-
practice cases include Jacksonville Medical Ctr. v. Akers, 560 So. 2d 1313 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1990); Southwest Community Health Servs. v. Smith, 755 P.2d 40 (N.M. 1988);
Parker v. St. Clare's Hosp., 553 N.Y.S.2d 533 (App. Div. 1990); John C. Lincoln Hosp. &
Health Ctr. v.. Superior Court, 768 P.2d 188 (Ariz. CL App. 1989).
194. 236 N.W.2d 543 (Mich CL App. 1975).
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Hospitals, therefore, are not insurers of the competence of their
medical staff. "A physician's negligence does not automatically mean
that the hospital is liable, and does not raise a presumption that the
hospital was negligent in granting the physician staff privileges."' 95
Hospitals are under no duty to constantly supervise and second
guess the activities of physicians, other than the duty to remove physi-
cians known to be incompetent."9 Once a physician has been granted
staff privileges, the hospital will not be held liable unless it had reason
to know that malpractice would likely take place. 97 Where a previ-
ously competent physician with staff privileges develops a pattern of
incompetence, which the hospital should become aware of through its
peer review process, the hospital may be held liable.198 In Albain,
the court determined that the plaintiff failed to prove that but for the
defendant hospital's lack of care in reviewing the treating physician's
credentials, it would have denied the physician's staff privileges.
There are no West Virginia cases which fully explore the liability
of hospitals for negligence in granting privileges or policing their
medical staffs. The court briefly discussed the issue in Roberts v.
Stevens Clinic Hospital, Inc.,19 a medical malpractice action in
which the jury awarded $10 million, finding the defendant-physician 82
percent negligent and the defendant-hospital 18 percent negligent. Re-
jecting the hospital's assertion that the trial court erred -in failing to
direct a verdict in its favor, the supreme court pointed out:
Mhe plaintiff also introduced evidence that the hospital was negligent in
granting Dr. Magnus full surgical privileges in light of the fact that before
coming to Stevens Clinic Hospital he had been primarily a family practi-
tioner and had never previously been granted full surgical privileges.'"
195. Albain v. Flower Hosp., 553 N.E.2d 1038, 1046 (Ohio 1990) (citing Crumley v.
Memorial Hosp., Inc., 509 F. Supp. 531 (D. Tenn. 1978)); Mooney v. Stainless, Inc., 338
F.2d 127 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 925 (1965).
196. Albain, 553 N.E.2d at 1046.
197. Ia at 1045.
198. Id.
199. 345 S.E.2d 791 (W. Va. 1986).
200. Id. at 798.
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The issue was also mentioned in Rine v. Irisari,°1 where the
court indicated that there was a claim that one of the physicians who
treated the infant did not have privileges to care for premature infants
experiencing complications. 2°2 However, since the physician reached
a settlement with the plaintiff, the issue was not discussed by the
court.
2 03
Under the MPLA, the hospital's duty to screen and monitor physi-
cians will be judged by similar hospitals in the same or similar cir-
cumstance. Absent a "common knowledge" argument, the plaintiff will
be required to prove the case by qualified expert testimony.2°4 These
cases are difficult to prosecute. The privilege granted to hospital
credentialing committees shields from discovery the hospital's decision
making process in granting credentials.20 5 Only documents not cov-
ered by the privilege are discoverable. Second, the plaintiff must prove
not only negligence by the doctor, but that it was foreseeable in the
credentialing process.
V. LABILITY OUTSiDE THE MPLA
Discussions of hospital liability are generally restricted to the
traditional medical malpractice case, now governed by the MPLA.
However, suits by persons who are not patients are not covered by the
MPLA and are governed by traditional common law principles.2"
Hospitals, like other property owners, owe duties to the general public,
or persons other than patients, to maintain a reasonably safe facili-
ty.20
7
201. 420 S.E.2d 541 (W. Va. 1992).
202. I at 543.
203. Id
204. MPLA § 7.
205. See Young v. Saldanha, 1993 WL 128066 (W. Va. Apr 23, 1993); State ex rel.
Schroades v. Henry, 421 S.E.2d 264 (W. Va. 1992).
206. Ricottilli v. Summersville Mem. Hosp., 425 S.E.2d 629 (W. Va. 1993); see also
Huffman v. Appalachian Power Co., 415 S.E.2d 145 (W. Va. 1991) (duties of property
owners).
207. See Farrell, supra note 71, at 282-83.
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Two significant decisions in West Virginia raised questions as to
the liability of hospitals for injuries outside the context of the MPLA.
A shocking verdict came when a hospital was held liable for negligent
infliction of emotional distress where a nonemployee security guard
was bitten by a patient with AIDS. In Johnson v. WVU Hospitals,
Inc. ,28 the court affirmed a two million dollar verdict, finding that
the hospital was negligent in failing to warn the guard of the danger
when he was called in to restrain the patient, notwithstanding the
statutory confidentiality afforded to IV test results.29 The court ex-
pressly noted that the hospital violated its own rules by failing to post
a warning that the patient was infectious.21°
In another case, Funeral Services by Gregory, Inc. v. Bluefield
Community Hospital,2n the plaintiff, a mortician, claimed exposure to
the AIDS virus during the embalming of a body sent to the mortuary
from the defendant hospital without any warning that the patient had
been infected with AIDS at the time of his death. The plaintiff
claimed that he sustained severe emotional distress due to the fear of
contracting the AIDS virus.
The court did not discuss whether the hospital or other defendants
were negligent in releasing the body to the plaintiffs without warning
of the AIDS virus. Instead, it focused on the fact that the plaintiff
claimed emotional distress damages without any showing of physical
208. 413 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1991)
209. W. VA. CODE § 16-3C-3 (1991); see also 64 W. Va. C.S.R. § 64-1 (1990). Com-
pare Diaz Reyes v. United States, 770 F. Supp. 58 (D.P.R. 1991) (no duty to warn
patient's spouse of AIDS) with DiMarco v. Lynch Homes-Chester County, Inc., 559 A.2d
530 (Pa. Super Ct. 1989) (duty to inform spouse); see also Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327
(Md. 1993) (damages for fear of AIDS limited to time between notice of physician's HIV
status and patient's negative test results; further fear unreasonable).
210. Johnson is distinct from a claim that AIDS was spread by a health care worker,
which would be governed by the MPLA. See Bruce L. Ottley & Marguerite Nye Corboy, A
Reasonable Probability of Substantial Harm? Health Care Workers, AIDS, and the Duty to
Disclose, 25 HEALTH & Hosp. L.J. 65 (Mach 1992); see generally Cindy Berry, AIDS and
Hospital Liability, FOR THE DEFENSE, Dec. 1990, at 6. It is reminiscent of the duty to
warn placed upon psychiatrists. Smith v. Fishkill Health-Related Ctr., 572 N.Y.S.2d 762
(App. Div.), appeal denied, 586 N.E.2d 61 (N.Y. 1991) (psychiatrist not responsible for
third party harmed by patient unless faulty treatment was more than mere error in judg-
ment).
211. 413 S.E.2d 79 (W. Va. 1991).
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injury. The court found no evidence of actual exposure to the AIDS
virus, unlike Johnson v. WVU Hospitals, and stated:
We conclude that if a suit for damages is based solely upon the
plaintiff's fear of contracting AIDS, but there is no evidence of an actual
exposure to the virus, the fear is unreasonable, and this court will not
recognize a legally compensable injury."2 '
The court further noted that West Virginia did not recognize the
tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress.21 3 And since the
plaintiff did not allege a physical injury, the court found that the case
was barred by the one-year statute of limitations applicable to inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress.
Johnson and Funeral Services create the spectre of liability for
hospitals for failure to warn nonpatients of the dangers of the infected
patients and comparable dangers. This liability is somewhat similar to
that recognized in the psychiatric field, beginning with Tarasof v.
Regents of the University of California,214 where the court found that
a therapist could have a duty to warn foreseeable victims of the vio-
lent intentions of patients. The duty to warn occurs when the therapist
determines under reasonable professional standards that a patient poses
a serious threat to another. 15 As suggested in Funeral Services, the
court will not extend liability for fear of AIDS beyond the context of
Johnson, where there was actual exposure to the virus.
212. Id at 84. Compare Faya v. Almaraz (suit against HIV infected surgeon does not
require actual transmission).
213. It is questionable whether this is still true, see supra note 130.
214. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (en banc); see also Abille v. United States, 482 F.
Supp. 703 (N.D. Cal. 1980); Nieves v. City of New York, 458 N.Y.S.2d 548 (App. Div.
1983).
215. See Peck v. Counseling Servs. of Addison County, Inc., 499 A.2d 422 (Vt. 1985)
(counselor under duty to warn parents that their son, his patient, threatened to burn down
their barn); In re Estate of Votteler, 327 N.W.2d 759 (Iowa 1982); Curry v. United States,
836 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1987); Sellers v. United States, 870 P.2d 1098 (6th Cir. 1989).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The MPLA benefitted West Virginia hospitals by defining the
standard of care and elevating actions against hospitals to malpractice
status, requiring expert testimony to establish a prima facie case of
liability. Despite these and other protections afforded by the MPLA,
hospitals continue to face liability in several other areas, particularly as
a result of the expansion of vicarious liability for nonemployee physi-
cians. Unfortunately, this judicial expansion of liability will continue to
negate, to some extent, the benefits of the MPLA to hospitals, particu-
larly when named as defendants on pure vicarious liability theories.
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